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# UNIT HISTORY(U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION

TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

# 1984

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#### FOREWORD

USMLM's Unit History serves several important informative functions:

- It provides an annual chronology of the Mission's operational accomplishments in overt intelligence collection.

- It summarizes developmental trends within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and East German Armed Forces.

- It is a repository of information pertaining to USMLM's role as a military liaison mission representing the Commander in Chief, US Army Europe to the Commander in Chief, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

- It contributes to the military history program of the Armed Services.

USMLM's 1984 Unit History joins those from previous years to comprise an important record of trends, precedent and policy. As such it becomes a most useful reference document in the conduct of the Mission's daily affairs.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION  
UNIT HISTORY  
1983

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PART I GENERAL

A. (C) MISSION.

1. The primary mission of USMLM is to carry out responsibilities for liaison between CINCUSAREUR, on behalf of US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR), and CINCSFG and to serve as a point of contact for other US departments and agencies with CINCSFG, in accordance with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

2. The secondary and confidential mission of USMLM is to exploit its liaison status and attendant access for collection of intelligence information in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

B. (C) REFERENCES

1. TDA ELWLAUAA
2. USEUCOM DIRECTIVE 40-18, 30 Mar 78
3. USAREUR REGULATION 383-27
4. USAFE Regulation 23-11, 05 Feb 79
5. 7113 Special Activities Squadron Regulation 23-5, 01 Aug 79
6. USMC Table of Organization 5503, 17 Dec 76

C. (C) ORGANIZATION. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement (Annex A), signed in April 1947, authorized the exchange of Military Liaison Missions between the Soviet and US Military Headquarters in Germany and laid down general guidelines for their activities and for the support to be rendered by the headquarters to which they were accredited. The agreement provided for 14 accredited personnel, with complete freedom to travel, except in areas of military dispositions. The 14 accredited personnel "will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations."

D. (C) STATISTICS.

1. (C) Intelligence Information Collection. In carrying out its second and classified mission, USMLM dispatched 513 reconnaissance tours into the GDR for a total of approximately 580,000 kilometers. The Mission produced 992 Intelligence Information Reports based on information acquired during these tours.

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2. (U) Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA). In 1984 HQ GSFG levied 48 TRA. Section II, paragraph C contains details.

3. (U) Detentions and Incidents. USMLM tours were detained nine times in 1984, as compared to 12 in 1983.

4. (U) Liaison and Representation. CUSMLM or his representative met with SERB or HQ GSFG representatives a total of 17 times to discuss a variety of topics. See Section III, paragraph B.

E. (C) ORGANIZATION.

USMLM, with its support base in West Berlin, is able to employ all 14 accreditations (passes) for operational and liaison purposes in East Germany. Details of pass utilization and of the tri-service organization are provided in succeeding sub-paragraphs:

1. Pass Utilization. The 14 accreditations provided for by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement are normally held as follows:

CUSMLM (Army)	1
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCUSMLM) (USAF)	1
Naval Representative (NAVREP) (USMC)	1
OIC, Potsdam House (Army)	1

Liaison Officers

Army	4
USAF	2

Liaison NCOs

Army	3
USAF	1

2. Army Element. The TDA in effect on 31 Dec 84 authorizes 11 officers, 26 enlisted personnel, and four Department of the Army civilians.

3. Air Element. The Air Element is composed of 5 officers and 11 enlisted personnel, organized as Detachment 16, 7113 Special Activities Squadron.

4. Naval Element. The USMLM naval element consists of one USMC officer.

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## PART II. COLLECTION

A. (C) GROUND DIVISION COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (All elements of this section, to include photography, classified CONFIDENTIAL).

1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 1984 in GSFG, as seen by Ground Division, appeared to be a period of consolidation following the massive organizational and procedural changes which occurred in 1983. The phased training system has been totally implemented throughout GSFG and apparently is now the accepted method of assimilating troop replacements. Evidence, especially from SANDDUNE, continued to confirm the undermanning in GSFG combat units, but the issue of manning in combat support and combat service support units remains unresolved.

Equipment upgrades continued apace during 1984. GSFG expanded its program to increase the number of guns in artillery battalions at division and army level from 18 to 24, continued the conversion to SS-21 from FROG-7 within maneuver divisions and supported the deployment of SS-12 SCALEBOARD into the forward area. The T-80 tank became fully operational in the 9 TD and 11 GTD of 1 GTA, and was seen repeatedly in the 27 GMRD/8 GA area. (Further details on tank developments in GSFG during the past year are discussed in para 2 below.)

From a readiness point of view, perhaps the most significant change within GSFG in 1984 was the lack of participation in harvest support. USMLM observed nothing to suggest that GSFG supported the harvest in the Summer - Fall of 1984. No camps were formed nor vehicles and personnel shipped to the Soviet Union. It remains to be seen whether GSFG has shed this burden once and for all, but for at least 1984 the Soviet Army in East Germany has eliminated one of its major training distractions.


The East German Army, although obviously lagging behind GSFG, continued to upgrade its equipment as well. During 1984 SS-21, SA-8, BMP M-1981 (BMP-2) and TWIN EAR were all seen with East German units for the first time. In addition, two probable reserve divisions subordinate to MD V and associated with equipment and ammunition storage facilities appear to have been formally established (see paragraphs 3h & k following).

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2. TANK DEVELOPMENTS IN GSFG. 1984 was a very dynamic period for tank developments within GSFG, and Mission coverage of the tank problem reflected this dynamism. The high point of Mission coverage was achieved at the very outset when on the early morning of 1 January 1984 USMLM obtained exterior and interior photography of the T-64B which confirmed that it fires a missile and has a laser range-finder.



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On 22 February 1984, almost a full year after the initial sighting of the T-80 in Halle, USMLM observed and photographed the first partially untarped T-80. The photography helped substantiate that this tank has a turbine engine and more fully revealed details of the suspension system, but the turret and fire control system remained hidden. VRN from the transporter were from the 23 TR/9 1D which established that T-80 had been deployed with units in the 1 GTA.



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Observations by the NAVREP during Warsaw Pact Exercise YUG 84 corroborated information previously acquired by SANDDUNE regarding the distribution of the T-64B. He followed the move of 16 GTR/207 MRD during the exercise. Each tank battalion within the regiment had two companies of T-64A and one company of T-64B, exactly what had been reflected in SANDDUNE documents.

Throughout the summer of 1984 T-64B appeared more frequently in units formerly equipped only with the T-64A. Among the units to receive the T-64B in this period was the 35 MRD garrisoned in Dallgow-Doebritz. USMLM photography of these tanks showed that additional armor had been placed on the side and top of the turret, possibly to protect against top-attack weapons.



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In September BRIXMIS observed over 100 T-80 moving into the Letzlinger Heide Training Area on rail flats. This is the single greatest number of T-80 seen to date. Side numbers of associated vehicles were from two tank regiments of 9 TD, thus indicating a complete conversion to T-80 in these units.

On 7 November 1984 the NAVREP conducted an exhaustive reconnaissance of the Dallgow-Doberitz training area. He photographed a number of tank training boards. Among them were two boards describing training norms for tank crew members. The boards indicate that the T-80 and T-64B fire a missile and the T-80 does not have a diesel engine. They also mention possible variants for the T-64B and T-80. This is the first information from any source regarding T-80 or T-64 variants.

Нормативы по огневой подготовке.					
Наименование норматива	Кто выполняет	Кодер объекта	Время по времени		
			Норматив	Хорошо	Удовлетворительно
1. Вводка в бой экипажа в танк:					
- танка 3 выстрела по целям (включая в бой)	экипаж	249 434 447	2 мин 25 с	2 мин 40 с	3 мин 10 с
- выстрелы по целям (включая в бой)	экипаж	249 447	40 с	45 с	55 с
2. Испытание экипажа танка:					
- экипаж 2 выстрела	экипаж на экипажа	для всех 40	10 с	10 с	21 с
- экипаж 1 выстрел	экипаж на экипажа	249 434 447	25 с	30 с	35 с
3. Испытание экипажа танка после выстрела:					
- экипаж 4 выстрела	экипаж на экипажа	для всех 40	25 с	20 с	35 с
- экипаж 1 выстрел	экипаж на экипажа	249 434 447	45 с	50 с	1 мин
4. Испытание экипажа танка:					
- экипаж 4 выстрела	экипаж на экипажа	для всех 40	1 мин 30 с	1 мин 40 с	2 мин
5. Испытание экипажа танка:					
- экипаж 4 выстрела	экипаж на экипажа	для всех 40	2 мин 40 с	3 мин 20 с	4 мин 20 с
- экипаж 4 выстрела	экипаж на экипажа	для всех 40	3 мин 40 с	4 мин 20 с	5 мин 20 с
- экипаж 4 выстрела	экипаж на экипажа	434 447 210	2 мин 40 с	3 мин	3 мин 30 с
6. Испытание экипажа танка:					
- экипаж 4 выстрела		447 434 210	45 с	50 с	1 мин
- экипаж 4 выстрела		434 447 210	45 с	50 с	1 мин

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As 1984 drew to a close the Missions had made considerable progress in resolving the technical and order of battle questions associated with new tank deployments in GSFG. The T-64A, deployed in 2 GTA, 3 SA and 20 GA, had been almost fully exploited. The missile firing T-64B continued to be deployed on the basis of one company per tank battalion in units holding T-64A, and the majority of tech intel questions had been answered. T-80 was being introduced into 1 GTA and 8 GTA, and although a complete battalion complement had not been observed they appeared to be replacing the T-62 on a one for one basis.

Despite the wealth of information the Missions had accumulated, we still had not seen an untarped T-80. In late December this shortcoming was rectified when USMLM acquired limited photography of the rear of a T-80 as it moved at night from the rail siding at Gross Ammensleben into the Letzlinger Heide PRA.



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Five days later FMLM as a result of a very patient stake-out of a tactical route obtained the first daylight photography of the elusive T-80 as it moved north from the Koenigsbrueck PRA. Side numbers identified the T-80 as coming from the 40 GTR/11 GTD. This was the first solid association of T-80 with 11 GTD.



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After some eighteen months of anticipation, we were struck by the similarity between the T-80 and T-64B. The photography supported all the information previously acquired by other means. T-80 clearly represents an evolutionary not revolutionary design and has much in common with earlier Soviet tanks, particularly the T-64B.

Although the Missions enjoyed a very successful year in 1984 vis-a-vis the tank, there are obviously many more questions which need to be addressed, and considerably more photographic coverage of the T-80 is needed. Perhaps most disconcerting from our point of view, however, is the fact that the untarped T-80 seen moving into the LHTA in December were with vehicles from the 10 GTD/ 3 SA. What happened to the neat deployment pattern of T-64A and B in the north and T-80 in the south? We hope to shed some light on this and other issues in the coming year.

### 3. OTHER SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS:

a. 07-15 Jan. The 47 GTD/3 SA conducted a major river crossing exercise at the northern Elbe crossing sites near Sandau (UUC153) supported by other 3 SA elements. The 47th's three tank regiments, the MRR and Arty Regiment participated. 3 SA support included the Ponton Bridge Regiment, Signal Regiment, and Arty Regiment. This was the last USMM coverage of a full-scale river crossing on the northern Elbe prior to the imposition of the new PRA in May which closed off this area.


b. 11-18 Feb. 10 GTD/3 SA conducted its first divisional exercise since relocating to the Altengrabow PRA from Potsdam. USMM coverage of the exercise revealed numerous equipment upgrades and organizational anomalies which indicate a possible reconfiguration of 61 GTR and 248 GMRR to a brigade structure.



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c. On 24 Mar a USMLM tour obtained the first ground photography of the VASILEK 82mm automatic mortar in its GAZ-66 carrier. The mortar was with elements of the 207 MRD.



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d. 26 Mar - 1 Apr. Elements of six GSFG, East German and Polish divisions participated in Warsaw Pact Exercise YUG [SCUTH] - 84. The exercise involved large scale road, rail and tactical movement from the Jueterbog PRA through the Altengrabow PRA into the Letzlinger Heide PRA, culminating in a river crossing. Of special interest was the short notice mobilization of civilian East German vehicles and personnel to support military units.



e. On 09 Apr 84 a USMLM tour observed the AKS-74 M1984 rifle with elements of the 9 TD/1 GTA. This was the first observation of the AKS-74 M1984 in GSFG.

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f. 17 May 84. 22 152mm Field Gun M1976 were observed in a compound on Jaennersoorf Training Area 401. This was the first solid evidence of a 24 gun battalion in the 2 GTA's Arty brigade.

g. On 1 May a USMLM tour gained access to an unsecured Air Defense bunker at Tonndorf Deployment Area 401, which is associated with HQ 8 GA. Within the bunker were numerous posters which outline operational characteristics and deployments of both Soviet and NATO Air Defense assets as well as charts containing Soviet information on NATO air and AD weapons systems. In addition, NATO air tactics and doctrine were described. Of particular interest was a map depicting Central Europe and Western USSR which was annotated with columns for entries probably concerning the flight path of recon satellites.



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h. On 17 May USMLM observed and photographed a new Unit Vehicle Identifier (UVI) on an EGA truck in the vicinity of Retzow 592/Anklam 501. This suggested the existence of a new reserve maneuver division subordinate to MD V.



i. On 05 June a USMLM tour obtained excellent video coverage of a tracked vehicle move by elements of the 10 GTD. Coverage provided unique views of Soviet armored vehicles travelling cross-country and negotiating difficult terrain and suggests the tremendous future potential for video collection.

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j. 28 June - 04 July. A major TVD level exercise, ZAPAD (WEST) - 84, took place in East Germany. The exercise involved Front, Army and Divisionlevel comms units from GSFG as well as non-GSFG signal units. USMLM tours provided extensive coverage of the exercise to include the tactical play by elements of 6 GMRD/20 GA and CPX play by elements of 3 SA. The cover name of the exercise was revealed first by a Soviet officer at the annual USMLM 4th of July picnic at Potsdam.




k. On 10 and 20 Oct observations of yet another new UVI associated with an East German Army reserve storage facility, Grimme 501, by USMLM tours confirmed a second probable MD V subordinate reserve division.

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1. On 27 Nov the NAVREP obtained the first ground photograph of SS-12 canisters and their transporters as they moved at night from Neustrelitz towards the Waren PRA. This was the first Mission sighting of Soviet analogous measures in East Germany.



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## B. AIR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

NOTE: All succeeding sub-paragraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1. General: Soviet and East German Air Forces continued a steady and consistent upgrade of equipment and facilities throughout 1984.

### a. Aircraft and Air Operations:

#### 1) Soviet:

a) Helicopters: The number of HIND E MOD regiments in GSFG equipped with the 23mm cannon increased from one to three. By year's end HIND E MOD equipped regiments were located at Mahlwinkel, Parchim and Stendal Airfields. At least three border sites (Grevesmuhlen, Quedlinburg, and Wachstedt) also have one HIND E MOD (23mm cannon) regularly deployed. Another significant development was the first Mission sighting in GSFG of the actual IR Jammer on a HIP H assigned to Oranienburg Soviet Airfield. HIP K, originally stationed only at Allstedt Airfield, were further introduced to Dresden-Hellerau. These upgrades signify a considerable upgrade for GSFG in both helicopter firepower and ECM capability.

b) Fixed Wing: There was a reduction in total sorties observed, but actual training appeared to be more intense. A re-rolling of Altenburg aircraft was initiated as FISHBED aircraft were phased out and replaced by FLOGGER C/D and a new FLOGGER variant termed the D/J MOD. Further upgrades occurred with the assignment of yet another FLOGGER variant, the FLOGGER K, at Altes Lager and Koethen Airfields. The AS-12 Tactical Anti-Radiation Missile (TARM) was observed only twice during the year, but the best photography of the missile to date was obtained. Employment of Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (TASMs) also figured prominently. A new version of the AS-14 TASM, possibly TV-guided, was photographed on both FLOGGER J and FITTER H while FENCER C was observed for the first time firing a TASM, the AS-7. Additional launches of AS-7, AS-10, and AS-14 TASMs provided significant data for analysis.

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2) East German:

a) Helicopters: HIND D at Basepohl and Cottbus Airfields were reconfigured with the IR Jammer mount and chaff/flare dispenser. Prior to these modifications, this equipment had been employed only with GSFG forces. A HIP Command and Control variant was also introduced at Basepohl and Cottbus. This is the first C<sup>2</sup> helicopter with the EGAF.

b) Fixed Wing: The construction of Laage Airfield has been monitored on a regular basis. The base is considered operationally ready. Units and aircraft which will occupy the base should be identified early in 1985. No other significant changes in the EGAF were observed.

b. Electronics/SAMS:

1) Soviet: Technical-quality photography of a modified LONG TRACK C at Wittenberg SA-4 Site revealed design similarities between its END BOX and that of the DOG TAIL radar. This enhanced LONG TRACK possibly has a function and purpose similar to DOG TAIL's. The Soviets augmented Quedlinburg EW Site with an as yet unidentified radar or antenna and also introduced a possible U/I radar at Hillersleben EW Site. The latter radar appears similar to SQUARE PAIR in design. Completion of a three-system chain of PRP-3 RAMONA sites in the western half of the GDR was also confirmed. This chain should afford full RAMONA coverage of the inter-German border.

2) East German: Photography of a deployed RP-4G precision approach radar for civilian and military air traffic was obtained at Schoenefeld Airfield. Excellent video coverage of BACK TRAP radar was obtained at Rovershagen Sub Air Defense Site, to include two BACK TRAP rotating in sync. Construction has steadily advanced at both Rostock/Gubkow and Berlin/Kraatz SA-5 Sites. The erection of a large environmental dome in the fire control area of the Gubkow site may signal preparations for receipt of SQUARE PAIR.

c. Miscellaneous:

1) Soviet: U/I construction near Merseburg Airfield was discovered. Hangar-style bunkers have been installed and may indicate an air defense function.

2) East German: U/I construction sites were discovered and monitored at Schuenermark, Fehrbellin, and Zachow. The sites have large bunker complexes and are considered to be air defense-related.

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
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2. Significant Achievements:

a. On 13 January, a newly deployed RP-4G precision approach radar was confirmed at Schoenefeld EG Civilian Airfield.

b. On 16 January, the first Parchim HIND E MOD with 23mm cannon were observed at Retzow Soviet Range. This was the second Soviet regiment in GSFG to upgrade to the dual 23mm cannon.


c. On 17 January, technical-quality photography of a modified LONG TRACK C radar was obtained at Wittenberg Soviet SA-4 Site.



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d. On 19 January, technical-quality photography of the AS-12 TARM was obtained during an extensive FLOGGER landing program at Finsterwalde Soviet Airfield.



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e. On 27 January, a Parchim HIND E was photographed carrying a U/I rocket pod. The pod appears similar to the UB-32x57mm rocket pod frequently carried by HIND and HIP helicopters. This new pod may indicate an improved rocket capability.



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f. On 3 February, a Parchim HIND E was photographed carrying stacked AT-6 SPIRAL ATGM mounts on its outer universal pylons. This sighting confirms HIND E's capability to carry a minimum of 20 SPIRAL missiles and indicates a formidable anti-armor capability.



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g. On 3 February, the best photography to date of the dorsal scoop on Neuruppin FITTER K was obtained at Retzow Range.




h. FLOGGER J photography on 4 and 5 February confirmed the re-rolling of Altenburg's air-to-air FISHBED to the ground attack FLOGGER airframe. Subsequent introduction of FLOGGER D/J MOD in June-July suggests the FLOGGER J were used as trainers in anticipation of the new D/J MOD's arrival.

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i. The first observation of a modified FLOGGER G, now designated FLOGGER K, was obtained at Altes Lager Soviet Airfield on 13 March. It is possible that this aircraft is being configured for a mini-AWACS role with improved interception capability at lower altitudes. Modifications include new dielectric patches, new wing roots, and new radomes. The electronic and structural changes should provide increased combat efficiency.



j. On 20 April, a modified AS-14 TASM was observed on a Mirow FLOGGER J. The modifications to the nose of the missile suggest a possible TV guidance system.

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k. On 25 April, the first sighting of an AS-14 TASM on FITTER H was made at Retzow Soviet Range. This appears to be the same AS-14 variant observed on 20 April. The FITTER H was from Templin Soviet Airfield. This sighting confirms FITTER H's ability to carry the AS-14 TASM, as well as confirming the weapon's presence at Templin.



l. A TALL KING C near Loburg was discovered by FMLM and reported in IR 1 215 1013 84. The new TALL KING is situated inside the Altengrabow PRA. These radars have usually been associated with Early Warning or SA-5 sites.

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m. On 30 April, HIND D at Basepohl EG Airfield were observed and photographed configured with the new IR Jammer mount and chaff/flare dispenser.



n. On 22 May, the entire AOB of the FLOGGER G/K regiment assigned to Altes Lager Soviet Airfield was obtained. Twelve FLOGGER K and 24 FLOGGER G were noted. This confirms that one of the regiment's three squadrons has been upgraded to FLOGGER K.

o. On 5 June, the first photography of an EGAF HIP Command and Control Variant was obtained at Basepohl EG Airfield. The aircraft appears to be a HIP G. This upgrade suggests the East Germans are forming Soviet-styled division support squadrons. Following this initial observation the HIP variant was also observed at Cottbus EG Airfield.

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p. On 6 June, BRIXMIS noted construction of an unidentified East German site near Fehrbellin. On 17 July similar East German construction was noted by FMLM near the village of Schoenermark, approximately 5km from Berlin/Kraatz EG SA-5 Site. Our IR 1 215 0096 84 gave the best photographic coverage to date of both sites. The installations are likely air-defense related.

q. On 12 June, a Neuruppin FITTER K carried ODD POD during activity at Belgern Soviet Range. This was the first time FITTER K had been seen with the ECM pod. Prior to this sighting the pod had been observed only on Allstedt FITTER H. FITTER K's battlefield survivability should improve with this newly confirmed capability.



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r. On 9 July, a Neuruppin FITTER K was observed at Retzow Soviet Range carrying a U/I bomb or pod. The device appeared to emit a constant bright light.



s. Confirmation of a complete PRP-3 RAMONA system in the southern GDR came on 15 July with the sighting of RAMONA at Kalte Stauden-Kopf. This ninth RAMONA confirms the completion of a three-system chain of PRP-3 on the GDR's western border.

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t. The first sighting of a FLOGGER D/J (MOD) was made at Altenburg Soviet Airfield on 23 July. The nose section of this aircraft was modified, to include new antennas.



u. Technical-quality photography of the DR-3 drone was taken near Wittstock Soviet Airfield on 27 July. Several passes of the drone were observed. FMLM photography provides the first good views of the drone's port side and bottom.

v. On 2 August, video coverage was acquired of Templin FITTER H firing 330mm rockets at Gadow-Rossow Soviet Range. This is the first firing of this weapon system observed in GSFG.

w. A multi-mission collection effort was used to monitor alert take-offs at Koethen and Altenburg Soviet Airfields on 3 August. Two Merseburg FLOGGER B equipped with AA-7 APEX and AA-8 APHID missiles scrambled from Altenburg.

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x. On 7 and 13 August, live-fire exercises were conducted at Gadow-Rossow Soviet Range. FITTER H fired the AS-10 TASM and FENCER C carried and fired an AS-7 TASM. This was the first observation of FENCER with TASMs in GSFG and the first recorded FENCER firing of a TASM. Both still photography and video coverage were obtained. FLOGGER J were also videotaped firing the AS-14 TASM. These firings are highly significant for analysis of tactics, burn times, flight times, etc.



y. On 19 August, HIP K were observed for the first time at Dresden-Hellerau Soviet Airfield. These additional HIP K indicate an expansion of ECM capabilities in GSFG.

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z. On 23 August, two FLOGGER K were photographed at Koethen Soviet Airfield. This is the second airfield in GSFG to receive this airframe.




aa. On 24 and 27 August and 5 September, live-fire exercises were conducted at Gadow-Rossow Soviet Range. Launches of the AS-10 TASM by FLOGGER J and FITTER H were observed. Complete flight logs and photography were acquired to include missile burn times, flight times, launch profiles, and tactics.

bb. On 30 August, technical-quality photography of nose modifications of the FLOGGER D/J (MOD) was obtained at Altenburg Soviet Airfield.

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
cc. On 5 and 12 October, a large and apparently inflated environmental dome was photographed in the fire control area of Gubkow EG SA-5 Site. An additional foundation was under construction for a probable second dome.



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dd. On 8 and 10 October, a U/I device was observed at Beckendorf Soviet EW Site. The apparatus appears to be a sensor or camera mounted on a tall mast. The site is five to seven kilometers from the West German border. A similar device was noted at Steinheid Soviet EW Site on 28 June.



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ee. On 16 October, a FLOGGER G from Koethen Soviet Airfield was photographed carrying an unusual AA-7 APEX missile. The missile was bright red with a white nose. The FLOGGER also carried a standard white APEX missile. The U/I missile may possibly be an electronic simulator.



ff. On 19 October, a U/I missile launch rail was observed on a FITTER H from Templin Soviet Airfield. This rail is possibly for the AS-9/11 anti-radiation missile.

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gg. On 4 and 26 October, a U/I construction site was photographed near Merseburg Soviet Airfield. Two arched concrete bunkers or hangarettas suggest a probable air-defense or missile-related function for the site.

hh. On 2 November, a HIP H from Oranienburg Soviet Airfield was photographed with the actual IR Jammer mounted. This is the first sighting of the Jammer itself in GSFG.

ii. On 8 November, a U/I electronics antenna/radar was sighted at Quedlinburg Soviet EW Site. The device is likely IFF or navigation related.



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jj. On 9 December, a probable third radome foundation was photographed at Rostock/Gubkow EG SA-5 Site. This may indicate that an increased number of SA-5 launchers will be employed at the site.

kk. On 11 and 17 December, FMLM photographed a U/I possible radar at Hillersleben Soviet EW Site. This is the first time this piece of equipment has been observed and photographed.

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### C. RESTRICTED AREAS

NOTE: ALL PARAGRAPHS AND SUBPARAGRAPHS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

1. PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA). On 16 May 1984, GSFG announced "minor" modifications to the PRA presently in effect in the GDR. The new PRA map obviously was the result of careful study and planning and an intimate knowledge of the geography of the GDR as it affects the Missions. There is no remarkable increase in total area denied to the Missions; however, boundaries have been redrawn and extended in such a fashion as to canalize and impede travel and to deny or restrict access to a very large number of targets. In most cases PRA boundaries have been delineated by roads with the specification that such roads must be considered part of the restricted area. Transit throughout East Germany, therefore, has been restricted considerably. Autobahns must be used to travel any distance or cross a major river, particularly the Elbe, but stopping on Autobahns that transit PRAs is now prohibited. Intelligence collection efforts have also been significantly hindered. Analysis has shown that, of some 185 formerly accessible SAM sites, radar sites, airfields, and air-to-ground gunnery ranges, approximately 28% were rendered inaccessible, and 39% were moderately to severely degraded for observation by the new PRAs. Thus 60 to 70% of air targets in the GDR were affected. Large numbers of the more important ground installations and their associated SANDDUNE targets, training areas, and the major Soviet river crossing sites on the Elbe are now in PRA. Following the change only two GSFG maneuver divisions are now completely accessible to the Missions. It is much more difficult to cover movement by both tracked and wheeled vehicles since many major tactical routes are included in the new PRA, the gaps between PRA such as the Altengrabow and Letzlinger Heide have been closed, and traditional military convoy routes are either in or border PRA. While the PRA change has opened a few new targets to USMLM, the overall effect of the change has been nothing short of catastrophic. Only through PRA reduction can we hope to recoup even a part of what has been lost and in fact by December 1984 there were hints that GSFG would be issuing a new PRA map with reduced restricted areas. A photo copy of the 1984 PRA map follows on the next page.

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2. TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRA).

a. In 1984, HQ GSFG imposed a total of 48 Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs), down from the 73 imposed during 1983. Similarities to multiple TRAs imposed during similar periods of time in the past lead to the belief that most TRAs were exercise/movement-related.

b. The new Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) map in East Germany altered the pattern and number of TRA somewhat. Previously open areas between PRAs are now permanently closed to Allied Mission travel and need not be covered by TRA during exercises.

c. TRA imposed during 1984:

1) TRA 001-84 through 006-84 all covered the general period 02-09 January. Of particular significance is that of TRA 001-84, 002-84, and 006-84, together with their adjacent PRAs, effectively created a five-kilometer deep barrier stretching almost the entire width of the mid-southern half of East Germany.

a) TRA 001-84, effective 02-06 January, connected the Finsterwalde and Eastern Border PRAs.

b) TRA 002-84, effective 02-07 January, connected the eastern portion of the Jueterbog and Eastern Border PRAs, including the Briesen-Brand PRA within this TRA.

c) TRA 003-84, effective 02-07 January, connected the Weimar and Lossa PRAs. The Schafstadt PRA was included completely within this TRA.

d) TRA 004-84, effective 02-08 January, encircled an area between the Northern Border PRA and the Gostrow PRA.

e) TRA 005-84, effective 02-08 January, connected the Northeastern Border PRA and the Tempin PRA.

f) TRA 006-84, effective 02-09 January, connected the western portion of the Jueterbog PRA with the Lehnin, Altengrabow and the Dessau PRAs.

2) TRA 007-84 through 011-84 were all in effect during the period 21-23 January. The small sizes and locations of these TRA suggested a possible command post exercise (CPX) by elements of the East German MD III, since no major maneuver areas nor main rail lines were completely blocked to Allied Mission coverage.

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3) TRA 012-84 and 013-84 were in effect during the period 01-10 February.

a) TRA 012-84 connected the Gotha and Weimar PRAs, masking possible exercises by elements of the 8 GA and the 4 MRD/MD III.

b) TRA 013-84 connected the southern portion of the Jueterbog PRA with the Grossenhain and Finsterwalde PRAs.

4) TRA 014-84 through 016-84 were in effect during the same general period as TRA 012-84 and 013-84. These TRA covered areas traditionally used for field training exercises (FTXs) during that time of year.

5) TRA 017-84 and 018-84 were both in effect during the period 07-16 February. They connected the Templin, Wittstock, Rathenow and Letzlinger Heide PRAs/Training Areas, and effectively denied Allied Mission access to road and rail movement between these training areas.

6) TRA 019-84, effective 30 March-18 April, connected the Ohrdruf, Blankenhain, Kahla and Saalfeld PRAs. It included the SSM and Artillery Training Area at Rudolstadt 401 and the HQ 8 GA deployment area at Bad Berka and Tonndorf.

7) TRA 020-84 and 021-84 were in effect during the period 30 March-20 April. They connected the Templin, Wittstock and Rathenow PRAs, including the east bank of the Northern Elbe Crossing Sites. They completely shielded movements by the 16 GTD and 12 GTD, and prevented extensive coverage of air activity at Gadow-Rossow Air-to-Ground Range.

8) TRA 022-84, effective 30 February-04 May, connected the Dresden and Border PRAs east of the city of Dresden.

9) TRA 023-84 through 025-84 were in effect during the period 12-20 May.

a) TRA 023-84 connected the Templin, Wittstock and Neubrandenburg PRAs, denying Allied Mission access to garrisons, deployment sites and maneuver routes traditionally used by the 16 GTD, headquartered in Neustrelitz. This area was previously covered by TRA twice in 1984 (TRA 018-84 [7-16 February] and TRA 020-84 [30 March-20 April]).

b) TRA 024-84 connected the Jueterbog, Falkenberg and Finsterwalde PRAs and denied access to road and rail routes into the Jueterbog PRA.

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c) TRA 025-84 connected the Border PRA with the Dresden and Koenigsbrueck PRAs and denied access to the same area covered by TRA 022-84 (29 March-04 May). This TRA, along with TRA 024-84, denied Allied Mission access, except by Autobahn, to the southeast portion of East Germany, south of Berlin and east of the Elbe River.

10) TRA 026-84 through 032-84 were all in effect during the period 02-10 June. These were the first TRA since the imposition of the new PRA boundaries. These TRA, in conjunction with their PRAs, formed a continuous restricted area throughout most of the southern half of East Germany.

11) TRA 033-84, effective 22-25 July, connected the Altengrabow, Dessau and Jueterbog PRAs and covered some of the normally used tactical routes for wheeled and tracked vehicle movement between the Altengrabow and Jueterbog areas.

12) TRA 034-84, effective 26-29 July, connected the Jueterbog PRA and the Eastern Border PRA and covered the tactical routes normally used for wheeled and tracked vehicle movement between the Jueterbog PRA and the Lieberose Training Area (located inside the Border PRA). This TRA was seen as a logical continuation of TRA 033-84.

13) TRA 035-84 through 037-84 were all in effect during the period 06-20 August.

a) TRA 035-84 connected the Templin and Wittstock PRAs and included tactical trails utilized by the 16 GTD and flight paths for the DR-3 Drone. The Allied Missions were effectively denied all access to this area.

b) TRA 036-84 connected the Wittstock PRA with the Perleberg and Rathenow/Letzlinger Heide PRAs, including the Northern Elbe River Crossing Sites. It included tactical trails and rail lines traditionally used by 3 SA and 20 GA units exercising in that area. The northern portion included flight paths for the DR-3 Drone.

c) TRA 037-84 connected the Altengrabow and Dessau PRAs with the Jueterbog PRA and included tactical routes and rail lines traditionally used by elements of the 3 SA and 20 GTD during exercises.

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14) TRA 038-84 was in effect during the period 10-20 August. This TRA, in conjunction with TRA 035-84, 036-84 and 037-84, completed coverage of the ring of tactical routes surrounding the Berlin area during that period. It specifically covered those routes used by the 6 GMRD and 25 TD for movement to the Jueterbog PRA prior to the initiation of a major exercise; alternately covering routes sometimes used by the 7 GTD, 32 TD and 9 TD for movement into the Lieberose Training Area.

15) TRA 039-84 through 043-84 covered traditional Soviet transit routes between PRAs and major Soviet Training areas, which shielded exercise-related movement between the major training areas in the Letzlinger Heide, Altengrabow, Jueterbog and Dessau PRAs from Allied Mission coverage. TRA 039-84 through 041-84 were in effect during the period 01-20 September, while TRA 042-84 and 043-84 were in effect during the period 01-25 September.

16) TRA 044-84 and 045-84 connected the Weimar, Lossa, Gotha and Border PRAs in the southwest corner of East Germany, covering traditional tactical routes used by the 8 GA. These TRA were in effect during the period 01-25 September.

17) TRA 046-84 was not used by USMLM, due to confusion which arose among the three Missions concerning the numbering of the previous seven TRA.

18) TRA 047-84, effective 14-20 September, connected the Quedlinberg, Dessau and Altengrabow PRAs, and completely encircled the Cochstedt PRA. This is an area traditionally used for movement to and air support for the Letzlinger Heide Training Area, particularly by elements of the 3 SA (10 GTD, 7 GTD, Independent Tank Battalion and the 7 GTD Recon Bn).

19) TRA 048-84, effective 18-25 September, connected the Prenzlau, Templin and Neubrandenburg PRAs. It covered areas which included wheeled and tactical routes occasionally used by elements of the 25 TD and 16 GTD. Spetsnaz units from Fuerstenburg have been reported to exercise in this area.

20) TRA 049-84, effective 25-30 September, connected the Wittstock, Parchim, Lubtheen, Pritzwalk and Perleberg PRAs. It denied Allied Mission access to training activity most likely associated with the 21 MRD.

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4. SUMMARY.

a. Temporary Restricted Areas were in effect during at least a part of each month between January and September, while no TRA were imposed during the last quarter of 1984.

b. There were 134 days in 1984 when at least one TRA was in effect against Allied Missions. TRA were in effect during the entire months of April and September. The TRA averaged 11.4 days each, ranging from 3 to 36 days in length.

c. The following table shows TRA days, by month, in 1984:

January 1984	02-09, 21-23
February 1984	01-16
March 1984	30-31
April 1984	01-30
May 1984	01-04, 12-20
June 1984	02-10
July 1984	22-29
August 1984	06-20
September 1984	01-30
October 1984	None Imposed
November 1984	None Imposed
December 1984	None Imposed

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C. DETENTIONS AND INCIDENTS (All succeeding subparagraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL unless otherwise indicated).

1. General. In carrying out USMLM's two missions in the GDR, accredited personnel repeatedly come into contact with Soviet and East German military personnel and the civilian population. The nature of certain of these contacts is such that reporting to higher headquarters and mention in the Unit History is appropriate. These contacts are divided into two categories:

a. DETENTION. Tour's freedom of movement is physically restricted. Accreditation documents are surrendered with or without the preparation by the Soviets of an official protocol (Akt). Circumstances surrounding a detention may be such that it is also reported as an incident.

b. INCIDENT.

1) Serious Incident. A relatively grave occurrence whose resolution may require action at a higher level than Chief USMLM/Chief SERB. Action taken frequently includes an exchange of letters at Chief of Staff or higher level.

2) Minor Incident. Occurrence whose resolution can be accomplished at the Chief of Mission/Chief SERB level or which requires no additional action.

2. DETENTIONS. Nine USMLM tours were detained in 1984:

a. Sandau (UU0055), 071307A Jan 84. A USMLM tour was conducting a reconnaissance of Soviet crossing sites on the Northern Elbe River at 071230A Jan 84 when they observed a Soviet probable PMP battalion deployed in the Sandauer Wald PTCA (UU0055). As the tour was departing the area, their vehicle became mired on a muddy tactical trail. Shortly thereafter, a ZIL-131 truck pulled up behind the tour vehicle and a Warrant Officer stood in front of it. The Warrant Officer was ultimately relieved by a ZIL-130. The Rathenow Kommandant was summoned and arrived at 071447A. He was accompanied by a Major and a female civilian interpreter. Following an exchange of documents, the Kommandant requested that the tour follow him to the VOPO Station in Havelberg (UU0357) so he could call SERB in Potsdam. After approximately a 15-minute wait outside the Havelberg Volkspolizei (VOPO) Station, the Kommandant returned and presented the tour with an Akt, accusing them of photographing military equipment (true) and being in a restricted area (not true). The Tour Officer refused to sign the Akt. Documents were returned at 071525A Jan 84 and the tour proceeded with its mission. Duration of detention: 2 hours, 18 minutes.

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b. Havelberg (UU0357), 121405A Jan 84. A USMLM tour was traveling south on an unnumbered road from Werben (QD0061) and passed several Soviet work crews who were cleaning mud off the road following the passage of a Soviet armored column. A Soviet Senior Lieutenant in charge of one of these groups was visibly upset at the passage of the tour vehicle. Approximately 3-4 kilometers further down the road, the tour came to a four-way road junction. Soviet columns occupied the three remaining approaches to the intersection, so the tour officer decided to reverse course. This took the tour past the work crews again. At 121405A Jan 84, as they passed one of the work crews, members of the crew made threatening gestures at the tour vehicle with their shovels. As the tour passed a group of these soldiers at a moderate speed (15-20 km/h), a Senior Lieutenant suddenly stepped from the side of the road and swung a long-handled shovel through the windshield of the tour vehicle. The vision of the tour crew was severely impaired and the driver immediately braked to avoid hitting any of the other soldiers standing on either side of the road. As the tour vehicle slowed, the troops surrounded the vehicle. The tour officer decided that further efforts to evade would only endanger the soldiers standing on both sides of the road and ordered the driver to stop the vehicle. Personnel conducting the detention were three officers and ten soldiers. The tour officer immediately challenged the Senior Lieutenant, bringing to his attention the existence of an agreement between both governments which gave the tour crew the right to be there. The Senior Lieutenant replied that there was a military operation in progress in the area and that the tour was not allowed to be there. The tour officer stated that if the Soviet government did not want mission members in the area, they would have imposed a Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) in accordance with normal practice. The Senior Lieutenant became visibly nervous at that point. Within 30 minutes of the initial confrontation, a Soviet Captain arrived on the scene. He asked the tour crew if they were all right; then he appeared to offer some serious criticism to the Senior Lieutenant who had swung the shovel. Following the detention, several tanks approached the area. To preclude the tour crew's observing them, the soldiers removed the tarp from a ZIL-131 and covered the tour vehicle with it for 2 1/2 hours. At approximately 1700A, the Rathenow Kommandant arrived and, after verification of credentials by both sides, requested the tour crew to follow him to Havelberg, where an Akt would be prepared. Once in Havelberg, the Soviet Kommandant entered a VOPO station to prepare the Akt, while the tour crew remained outside. Approximately 15 minutes later, he returned and stated that he had prepared the Akt (but did not offer to show it to

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the tour officer) and said that it contained two accusations - that the tour was behind Mission Restriction Signs (true) and that the tour was photographing military columns (not true at the time). He then asked the tour officer whether he would care to sign the Akt. When the tour officer declined, the Soviet Kommandant laughed and returned the tour crew's credentials. The actions of the Soviet Kommandant were cordial throughout. The tour was released at 121815A Jan 84 and arrived at the Glienicke Bridge at 122225A. The tour was delayed at the bridge for 20 minutes. Duration of detention: 4 hours, 10 minutes.

c. Sandau (UUD153), 141445A Jan 84. A USMLM tour was transiting Route 107 in the vicinity of Sandau (UUD153) in an effort to monitor a major Soviet river crossing exercise. The Soviets seemed to be particularly alert for Mission vehicles. As the tour was attempting to evade a Soviet road block, the vehicle became mired and a detention ensued. The initial reaction of the Soviet troops was hostile. They made a half-hearted effort to enter the vehicle and also managed to remove the valve cores from all five tires and remove the spare tire. The Rathenow Kommandant arrived and requested that the tour follow him to Havelberg. The tour officer pointed out that there was no air in the tires, and the Kommandant ordered the Soviets to fill them. Only one valve core was returned. The Akt was prepared in Havelberg, and the tour officer refused to sign it. The tour was released at 141940A, returned to the Mission House in Potsdam to change the tires, and continued its mission. Duration of detention: 4 hours, 55 minutes.

d. Belgern (UT695057), 131725A Mar 84. A USMLM tour was targeted against the Altes Lager Airfield and the Belgern Air-to-Ground Range. After observing and comprehensively photographing an active FLOGGER C/G morning flying program at Altes Lager, the tour departed for Belgern at approximately 1400A hours. Throughout the tour's stay at Altes Lager and during the drive to Belgern, intermittent MfS surveillance was detected. Immediately upon arrival in the Belgern area, the tour encountered an active air-to-ground range program in progress, involving FLOGGER D/J aircraft making gun/rocket/bomb attacks. The tour was able to position itself to observe and photograph this activity over the course of approximately two hours. Considerable information on FLOGGER air-to-ground tactics, to include attack profiles, weapons mix and use of flares, was recorded. Throughout this period, persistent MfS presence in the area necessitated cautious photography and numerous Observation Point (OP) changes. In addition to MfS activity, a crop duster aircraft buzzed the tour on two occasions. At approximately 1700A hours, an apparent Soviet airfield security element in a ZIL-130 suddenly appeared and gave chase to the tour. The tour was able

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to evade the ZIL-130 until transiting Belgern, where constricted streets and the presence of pedestrians argued against further evasive maneuvers. At one point, the tour vehicle was forced to back up and the ZIL-130 managed to bump into the tour vehicle, hooking its bumper with the left front fender and thus preventing any further movement. At approximately 1915A hours, the Torgau Kommandant arrived on the scene and the normal detention scenario followed. Deportment of detaining and Kommendatura personnel was correct. The tour was released at 2105A hours. Duration of detention: 3 hours, 40 minutes.

e. Karl-Marx-Stadt (US5535), 151315A May 84. A USMLM tour was transiting Karl-Marx-Stadt, enroute to Potsdam. As the tour vehicle slowed to make a right turn from Route 174 toward the Dresden Autobahn, three unmarked vehicles (presumably MfS) boxed in the tour vehicle at 1315A hours. Quick reaction of the Tour NCO averted collision with the lead vehicle, which had dangerously swerved into the tour's path. Slight contact was made, however, by the MfS cars when they tightened the box at front and rear. MfS personnel tried the rear and driver's door in a pro-forma attempt to gain entry. The Volkspolizei arrived at 1330A hours, a GAZ-53 arrived at 1350A hours, and the Karl-MarxStadt Kommandant and a Captain arrived at 1502A hours. Prior to the Kommandant's arrival, the tour was photographed countless times, to include many pictures after a Mission Restriction Sign (MRS) (brought in especially for this purpose) was erected in the vicinity of the tour vehicle. The tour followed the Kommandant to his office at 1520A hours; an Akt charging the tour with violation of a restricted area was then prepared. Conduct of Soviet personnel was proper throughout - even contrite and somewhat embarrassed in the face of MfS' arrogance. The tour was released at 1600A hours, and returned immediately to Berlin. Duration of detention: 2 hours, 45 minutes.

f. Gross Santerleben (PC6785), 021900A Jul 84. A USMLM tour had been dispatched to the vicinity of the Letzlinger Heide PRA to monitor tactical movements associated with the ongoing exercise "ZAPAD 84". The tour noticed traffic regulators in the vicinity and, being without surveillance, decided to check out a nearby tactical trail. While traveling north on the tactical trail looking for a suitable OP to monitor possible tracked vehicle movement, the tour suddenly encountered two BMP M-1981 heading south. The tour attempted a quick turn-around on the narrow trail, but the vehicle slipped into a hole and turned onto its side. The BMP crews offered assistance and then positioned their vehicles at opposite ends of the disabled tour vehicle. The Kommandant was summoned at the tour officer's request, and eventually arrived at 030105A Jul in a GAZ-66. The Magdeburg Kommandant questioned the Soviets at the



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scene and prepared an Akt, accusing the tour of being on an active military route (true) and of photographing military activity (not true). The tour officer was offered a copy of the Akt - if he signed it. The Soviets assisted in turning the tour vehicle onto its wheels and allowed the tour to depart unescorted. Soviet conduct throughout the incident was correct and proper. The tour departed the scene of the detention at 030155Z Jul 84. Duration of detention: 6 hours, 55 minutes.

g. Kirchmoser (UU2405), 241440A Aug 84. A USMLM tour vehicle's engine quit while the tour was approaching the Kirchmoser East German EW Site (UU237048). While attempting to restart the engine, the tour was observed and detained by an NVA Robur and a civilian Trabant. A second Robur replaced the Trabant at the tour vehicle's rear at 1450A hours. The tour vehicle's windows were covered with blankets at 1516A hours. Two Soviet officers from the Brandenburg Kommendatura arrived at 1630A hours. The tour was extensively photographed by NVA personnel and a Soviet photographer. While the tour vehicle was covered with blankets, the rear license plate and the passengerside mirror were removed. Other actions by all concerned were cordial and correct. An Akt, accusing the tour of espionage activities in the proximity of military "objects", was prepared and presented for signature. The tour officer denied the allegations and refused to sign the Akt. The tour crew was able finally to restart the vehicle after the relatively lengthy detention, suggesting that the engine had simply overheated (it was a very hot day). The tour was escorted to the Helmstedt Autobahn at the Ziesar Intertank (UT1793) and released at 1955A hours. Duration of detention: 5 hours, 15 minutes.

h. Wernigerode (PC0307), 281600A Aug 84. A USMLM representational tour, upon returning to their tour vehicle, parked in a public parking lot in Wernigerode, noticed that the vehicle was blocked by four empty VOPO vans. The tour officer called the Potsdam House at 1545A hours and notified the Mission of the probable detention. The tour returned to the scene at 1600A hours and saw three NVA soldiers and several VOPOs standing around the tour vehicle. At that time, a Soviet vehicle with a Soviet Major arrived with a Russian translator who spoke German. The tour's passes were handed over at that time, and were immediately returned to the tour officer. The Soviet Major then said he had to go with the VOPOs to the VOPO Headquarters. At 1650A hours, he returned with two other Soviet Majors and stated that one of the tour's guest passes only permitted travel to Potsdam. The point was argued and the tour was presented with an Akt, which accused a guest member of the tour of having traveled to Wernigerode without Soviet permission. The tour officer refused to sign the Akt. Photos of the tour vehicle, as well as the tour participants, were taken throughout the detention.

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The Soviets were cordial and somewhat embarrassed by the whole affair. The tour was released at 1715A hours. (Note: The issue of the discrepant guest pass resulted in a protest from the Chief of Staff, GSFG and the notification that the USAF NCO involved would no longer be allowed into the GDR.) Duration of the detention: 1 hour, 15 minutes.

1. Vicinity Cottbus (VT537283), 281015A Oct 84. A USMLM tour, during a routine check of Cottbus Training Area 490, became mired down while transiting an unavoidable muddy area. Shortly thereafter, as the tour was attempting to winch free, a GAZ-66 arrived on the scene and while approaching the tour car accidentally slid into the vehicle's left rear corner. After the occupants determined that the tour vehicle was stuck, the senior occupant, a Soviet Captain, sent his driver in the direction of the range house or bunker. The driver soon returned with a detail of ten troops, led by a probable Captain. The tour officer was asked to show his credentials, but indicated that passes could only be shown to a Kommandatura representative, who was subsequently summoned. At 1035A hours, five Soviet officers arrived, followed one-half hour later by three Kommandatura representatives (one Colonel, one Major and a civilian interpreter). The tour officer explained that the tour had taken the wrong road (not true) because it was too foggy to see. The Kommandatura replied to the tour officer that the tour was in a military training area, and that an Akt would have to be written. An Akt was soon prepared, which the tour officer declined to sign. Passes were then returned, along with a copy of the Akt. The Kommandant said he had to call Zossen and that the tour was to remain in place. While the tour officer was speaking to the Soviet officers on a variety of professional matters, one Soviet Lieutenant made half-hearted attempts to enter the tour vehicle (trying door handles and attempting to stick his hand through a partially-open window). At 1300A hours, two individuals with Airborne coveralls over civilian clothing arrived and started taking pictures. They wore no rank insignia, did not associate with nor speak to anyone else, and could have been either Soviet or East German security elements. The tour was escorted to an Autobahn entrance at VT513308 at 1410A hours and released. Duration of detention: 3 hours, 55 minutes.

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3. Incidents. Other than those events reported earlier in Paragraph 2, four reportable incidents occurred in 1984:

a. Wustermark (UU590263), 280445A Jan 84. While attempting to pass a civilian vehicle, a USMLM tour encountered a patch of black ice, slid off the road, and struck a tree. The tour requested an East German civilian call the Mission House in Potsdam. Volkspolizei arrived on the scene within ten minutes. Standard photography was taken. At 0605A hours, a Soviet Major from the Elstal Kommandatura arrived. He recorded the tour's names, asked for details (no Akt was prepared), and departed at 0625A hours. A Mission recovery team arrived at 0630A hours, and the tour departed the scene at 0900A hours with the recovery team. The tour members were checked at the Berlin Army Hospital for minor bumps/bruises sustained in the accident.

b. Zechow (UU600805), 141115A Mar 84. A USMLM tour was sent to check a temporary communications site/bivouac area and tactical trail in the vicinity of UU587806. The tour observed the site from a distance before approaching, and saw no sign of activity/occupation. The tour drove into the site and saw no sign of recent use. While exploring a trail through heavy underbrush near the site, the tour officer left the vehicle to reconnoiter on foot the area over a slight rise. Within moments after the tour officer left the vehicle, three soldiers emerged from the brush and punctured three of the vehicle's tires; one of the three pursued the tour officer and called out "Komm' mal hier!" ("Come here!"). The tour officer turned and ran from the soldier, and the driver maneuvered the vehicle past the other soldiers and picked up the tour officer. The tour departed the site, noting that a fourth soldier had joined the group. The four soldiers watched the tour depart, but made no attempt to pursue on foot. With three tires going flat, the tour halted in the town of Zechow (UU600805) and telephoned for recovery. The tour remained in Zechow from 141130A until 141600A, when a recovery tour from Berlin arrived with new tires. During their stay in Zechow, two Soviet vehicles transited the town, but were apparently not searching for the tour. The townspeople were very friendly toward the tour and commented that occasionally Soviet armored vehicles used a nearby trail. After replacing the flat tires, the tour officer briefed the Recovery OIC and continued the tour. The tour returned to Berlin at 151230A Mar 84. The four soldiers who punctured the tires of the tour vehicle wore two-piece hooded green camouflage suits and black lace-up boots with trousers tucked into the boots, carried brown knapsacks slung diagonally across their chests, and wore camouflage paint on their face and hands. They had no insignia of rank or nationality, carried no arms, and did not appear to have radios or other equipment.

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c. Laage East German Airfield (UV215786), 101530A Oct 84. An off-duty East German officer attempted to detain a USMLM tour as the tour transited Route 103 near Laage East German Airfield. A maroon Wartburg passed the tour in the opposite direction, made a U-turn and attempted to overtake the tour vehicle and force it into a ditch on the right-hand side of the road. In an attempt to avoid an accident, the tour vehicle braked hard, but the Wartburg swerved into the tour vehicle's path, banging its right-rear fender into the tour vehicle's left-front bumper. The Wartburg then skidded, went into the ditch and came to a stop. The Wartburg was immobilized, but the driver appeared unhurt. Therefore, the tour continued to Berlin, crossing the Glienicke Bridge without incident at 1845A hours.

d. USMLM Potsdam House, 221845A Oct 84. Two East German civilian males, 17-18 years old, gained access to the USMLM Potsdam House Compound by climbing the rear wall which abuts an East German sanitarium. They entered the house through a basement door and were immediately confronted by the Potsdam House OIC. The two males, speaking only German, stated that they wished to defect to the West. The Potsdam House OIC informed them that there was no way USMLM could assist them and that they should immediately leave. The individuals seemed to understand, offered no further argument, and departed the area at 1850A hours over the same wall. The VOPO guard at the front entrance to the compound was apparently unaware of the defection attempt.

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E. (C) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT (IIR) PRODUCTION.

USMLM IIR production figures for 1984 are listed below; 1983 figures for the same category follow in parentheses:

AIR DIVISION (1 215)

USMLM Originated:	95	(102)
Based on Allied Reports:	107	(129)
SANDDUNE Reports:	13	(004)
Total:	215	(235)

GROUND DIVISION (2 215)

USMLM Tour Reports:	248	(365)
SANDDUNE Reports:	252	(201)
Based on Allied Reports:	143	(303)
Total:	643	(759)

NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS (5 215):

Air Reports	9	(09)
Ground Reports	34	(13)
SANDDUNE Reports	17	(05)
Other Reports	1	(00)
Total:	61	(27)

TOTAL ALL IIR:	952	(1022)
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### PART III LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION

#### (C) GENERAL.

Relations with SERB specifically and GSFG in general were somewhat turbulent during 1984. The early part of the year was marred by all too present hostile and dangerous East German/Soviet reaction to Mission presence. This culminated in the ramming of a French tour in the Halle area which caused the first fatality in TriMission history. The Halle incident apparently convinced GSFG to issue cautionary directives regarding treatment of the Missions since the rest of the year saw a noticeable decline in these provocative practices. The new GSFG PRA map in May generated considerable correspondence, conversation, and reciprocal USAREUR imposed restrictions which also put a strain on the relationship. And finally, the threatened closure of the Glienicke Bridge in November resulted in a CINCUSAREUR protest letter along with several tense meetings with SERB which tended to cast a shadow on the end of the year. Since, however, our relationship with the Soviets always features contrasts and contradictions, 1984 also saw the first positive signs of a CINC-to-CINC meeting and a willingness on the part of SERB to undertake a considerable renovation project at the Potsdam compound.

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A. (C) OFFICIAL VISITORS: Visits by members of the intelligence community and others with a professional interest in USMLM's collection activity promote an informative dialogue which assists USMLM in its efforts to maintain an effective and active collection program.

The following is a selected list of key personnel briefed by USMLM in Berlin during 1984:

JANUARY

Lieutenant General Cathey	VICE CINCUSAFE
Brigadier General Patte	
Major General Cannon	USAREUR/DCSPER
Major General Swalm	Tac Warfare Ctr/CC
Representative (CA) Hunter	House Armed Services
	Committee (HASC)
Mr Battista	Staff Mbr HASC
Mr Bayer	Staff Mbr HASC
Dr Sculley	Asst SecArmy for R, D &
	Acquisition
Mr Kitson	Asst SecArmy for C <sup>3</sup> I
Ms Benacquista	INSCOM
MR Gooch	FSTC
MS Cooper	MICOM
Colonel Kolt	CIA
Mr Hodgnett	CIA

FEBRUARY

Brigadier General Cassity	Cdr, AFCC/USAFE/DC
Mr Tucker	Cncl, Senate Armed Svcs
	Committee Subcommittee
	for Manpower & Personnel
Brigadier General Holdaway	USAREUR/JAG
Colonel Coughran	322 ALD/CV
Colonel Beavers	322 ALD/LG

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MARCH

Major General Armstrong	Ch, US Mil Tng Mission, Saudi Arabia
Colonel Carroll	US Mil Tng Mission, Saudi Arabia
Major General Saint	Cdr, 1st AD
Brigadier General Drudik	ADC, 1st AD
Brigadier General Smith	ADC, 1st AD
Colonel Tilelli	CofS, 1st AD
Colonel Kremer	Cdr, 1st Bde/1st AD
Colonel Griffiths	Cdr, 2d Bde/1st AD
Colonel Downing	Cdr, 3d Bde/1st AD
Colonel Bernardi	DivArty, 1st AD
Colonel Dickson	DISCOM, 1st AD
Lieutenant Colonel Pape	G-2, 1st AD
Brigadier General Archibald	Cdr, 5 Sig Co

APRIL

Colonel Van Fleet	National War College
(+ 12 man group)	(NWC)
Mr Seibold	Bonn Gp, AMEMB
Brigadier General Parker	USAREUR/DCSI
Colonel Lackey	USAREUR/ODCSI
General Dalton	CofS, SHAPE
Colonel Gillespie	USAREUR/ODCSI
Colonel Johnson	USAREUR/ODCSI
Mr Peck	Dep Gen Counsel (Mil/Civ Affairs), Army Gen Cnsl
Mr Taylor	Office of Army Gen Cnsl
Brigadier General Eckelbarger	Cdr, VII Corps Arty

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MAY

Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan	Fld Sta Augsburg
Colonel Richards	USEUCOM/ECJ3
General Knowlton	CAPSTONE
Lieutenant General Lawrence	CAPSTONE
(+ 12 General Officers or designates)	
Colonel Tedeschi	Cdr, FSTC
Colonel Walker	Dir, AFMIC
Lieutenant Colonel Vande Hei	Cdr, STITEUR
Lieutenant Colonel Bobbitt	Cde (Des), STITEUR
Ms Eustice	AFMIC
Mr Creighton	FSTC
Major General McInerney	PACAF/DO&I
Colonel Elliott	PACAF/IN
Colonel Ezzell	Cdr, 6008 TAFB
Colonel Bishop	Cdr, ESP
Major General Reed	TAC/DO
Major General Craig	TAC/RQMTS
Colonel Arnaiz	TAC/IN
Dr Stubberud	HQ USAF/Ch Scientist
Mr Bowers	AMEMB Bonn/Admin Counsel
Mr Gamber	AMEMB Bonn/Admin Counsel
Lieutenant Colonel Rodriguez	Cdr, 7405th Ops Sqdn
Major General (Ret) Longanecker	Sp Asst to ACS/IN (AF) for Attache Affairs

JUNE

Colonel Moor & Party	403d MI Det
Colonel Spivey	7350 ABG/CC
Colonel Wagner	7350 ABG/CD
Colonel Clark	Cdr, Det 3, FTD
General Otis	CINCUSAREUR
Major General Fiala	CofS/UASREUR
Brigadier General Nagel	CofS/V Corps
Colonel Parnell	SGS/USAREUR
Lieutenant Colonel Torres-Cartegena	Cdr, 73d Sig Bn

JULY

Dr Price	MICOM
Mr Graves	MICOM
Ms Hoerth	MICOM
Ms Burton	MICOM
Colonel Ayotte	DATT, AMEMB Warsaw

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AUGUST

Mr Browne  
Mr Daly  
Ms Griesse  
Colonel Blanchard  
General Mullins  
Major General Bowden  
Major General Skipton  
General Lawson  
Commodore Kihune  
Rep (PA) McDade  
Mr Hawkins  
Mr Allen

Colonel Smith  
Major General Acker  
Major General Mitchell  
Colonel Glark  
Colonel Greife  
Major General Graves  
(+ Command Group)

NSA  
CIA  
CIA  
MILPERCEN  
CINCAFLC  
AFLC/DCS Materiel Mgmt  
AFLC/DCS Plans & Programs  
DCINCUSEUCOM  
USEUCOM/ECJ6  
House Appns Committee  
Dep Asst SECDEF for Intel  
Staff Member, House  
Appns Committee  
Ch, Cong Liaison Office  
3 AF/CC  
USCOB  
USCOB/CofS  
USAREUR/ODCSI  
Cdr, 3 AD

SEPTEMBER

Lieutenant General Odom  
Colonel Fichtl  
General Sennewald  
Major General Demoss  
Major General Small  
Ms Crawford  
Major General Pfautz  
Ambassador Goodby

Mr Ray

Colonel Brendel  
Mr Webb

Colonel Hickock  
Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew  
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson  
Mr Simon  
Lieutenant Colonel Plomgren  
Ms Buckner

ACSI/DA  
Cdr Fld Sta, Sinop Turkey  
Cdr/FORSCOM  
FORSCOM/DCSLOG  
Cdr, Mil Tfc Mgmt Cmd  
Army Gen Counsel  
ACSI/USAF  
Ambassador to Conference  
for Disarmament/Europe  
Dep Asst SECDEF for  
Reserve & Guard  
Readiness & Tng  
Office of Dep Asst SECDEF  
Asst SECDEF for Reserve  
Affairs  
USAFE/DOX  
BASC  
7580 Ops Sqdn/CC  
AMEMB Bonn  
EUDAC  
NCER AUGSBURG

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OCTOBER

Colonel Roney	Cdr, FldSta Berlin
Brigadier General Gordon	USAREUR/DCSI
Brigadier General Tabor	USAFE/IG
Colonel Hannam	USAFE/IG
Colonel Yankowski	Cdr, AF Spec Actys Ctr
Colonel Doxey	Cdr, Eur Sp Actys Area
Mr Johnson	Staff Member, Senate
	Armed Svcs Committee
Mr Emmerichs	House Armed Svcs
	Committee
Colonel (Ret) Turner	Former Chief USMLM
Brigadier General Krausz	ADC/3 ID
Senator (VT) Leahy	Senate Select Committee
	for Intelligence
	Oversight
Vice Admiral Burkhalter	IC Staff
Ambassador Isham	Chairman, DCI HUMINT
	Committee
Colonel Legget	7350 ABG/CD

NOVEMBER

Major General Perrouts	USAFE/IN
Brigadier General Boyd	USAFE/XP
Captain (USN) Marshall	USEUCOM
Major General Fiala	USAREUR/CofS
Mr Steinberg	Defense/Mil Affairs
Representative (AZ) Stump	Counsel to Sen Kennedy
Representative (OK) McCurdy	House Permanent Select
	Committee on Intelligence
Representative (FL) Ireland	House Permanent Select
	Committee on Intelligence
Mr Thielmann	House Permanent Select
	Committee on Intelligence
Brigadier General Powell	AMEMB Bonn, POL/MIL
	Office
	USAFE/ADO

DECEMBER

Colonel Lewis	HQ ESC/Dir Ops/Plans
Dr Welch	Dep Asst To SECDEF/Chem
	Matters
Vice Admiral Holcomb	DCINCAVEUR
General Donnelly	CINCUSAFE

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B. (U) RELATIONS WITH GSFG/SERB (All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated):

Meetings with Soviet Authorities: In 1984, 17 USMLM/SERB meetings took place. A total of 11 items of US-originated non-routine correspondence were passed to SERB. Five pieces of Soviet-originated non-routine correspondence were received by USMLM.

1. On 05 Jan, Chief USMLM met with CSERB at the latter's office in Potsdam to deliver a non-paper protesting the 2 Dec 83 Soviet violation of FRG airspace near Muehlhausen. Subsequent to translation, COL Rubanov indicated that delivery would be accomplished to competent authorities. In response to gentle needling by Chief USMLM about the dangers involved, Rubanov stated that GSFG was in fact aware of the consequences of border overflights which accounted for the strict measures taken by GSFG to prevent their occurrence. He further opined that investigation would prove the latest Allied assertion to be as baseless as similar protests delivered in the recent past by Chief USMLM.

2. On 161700A Jan, Chief USMLM met with COL Malygin, Deputy Chief SERB, at the latter's office in Potsdam. Topics included a US CINC-to-CINC proposal the recent rash of detentions, and particularly the 12 Jan detention in the course of which a Soviet lieutenant had smashed the windshield of the tour vehicle with a shovel (See also Detentions and Incidents, page 50). Malygin denied that an officer had wielded the shovel and rather ingenuously suggested that the damage resulted during a shovel-toting Soviet soldier's attempt to escape from the path of the USMLM onrushing tour vehicle. After additional prodding from the Chief of Mission, Malygin promised to bring the matter to his Headquarter's attention.

3. On 211600A Mar, Chief USMLM, at his request, met with COL Rubanov at the SERB Potsdam Office. Chief USMLM presented as the first item of business the following note verbale:

"The following incidents are brought to the attention of the Soviet External Relations Branch:

A. Belgern area, approximately 1700 hours, 13 Mar 84. A USMLM vehicle with MAJ Bohn, MAJ Black and TSgt Dewey was chased through the streets of Belgern by a Soviet ZIL-130 truck. As the USMLM vehicle was backing up in the congested town this same Soviet truck deliberately rammed into the front of the USMLM vehicle causing the damages shown in the enclosed photo.

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B. Zechow area, approximately 1100 hours, 15 Mar 84. Four Soviet soldiers surprised a USMLM vehicle with MAJ Wise and SSG Blake. Three of the four tires on the vehicle were slashed by the Soviet soldiers and threatening moves to include striking the windshield with a knapsack were made toward the USMLM vehicle and personnel. This was a very dangerous encounter and only the cool-headedness of the tour prevented more serious consequences. The tour vehicle was totally disabled and three new tires had to be brought in from West Berlin.

Such provocative contacts initiated by the Soviet military are not new and seem to be a part of deliberate policy on the part of GSFG to deal more harshly with the Allied Military Missions in the discharge of their legal responsibilities. These incidents are clearly in contravention of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and are very dangerous to all persons involved - US and Soviet. You will note that the Soviet Military Liaison Mission in Frankfurt is never treated in this crude and illegal fashion. I ask that you report these matters to CINCGSFG and provide assurance that they will not be repeated."

Rubanov indicated that the Belgern incident had been reported to the Chief of Staff and to the CINC and that disciplinary action had been taken against the driver of the ZIL-130. He professed to have no information concerning the Zechow incident and promised to look into the matter, after wondering aloud why USMLM had not reported it at the time to the responsible Kommandatura. Interestingly, he did not employ the usual SERB retort that USMLM brought such incidents upon themselves by their provocative and illegal activities.

Chief USMLM then dealt with a 16 Mar SERB letter reporting the aggressive actions of US troops directed against a Soviet flag tour in the Gruenewald on 14 Mar. Chief USMLM's reply was to the effect that all matters in Berlin were outside USMLM's jurisdiction, but that, in view of SERB'S concern, he had referred the matter to USCOB, and a response could be expected through normal channels.

4. On 23 Apr, SERB delivered a response to USAREUR Chief of Staff's letter of 12 Apr protesting the deliberate ramming of tour vehicles. Text of the response follows:

"Dear General,

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 Apr 1984 concerning the alleged cases of a premeditated ramming by Soviet military vehicles of vehicles of the American Military Liaison Mission.

I cannot agree with you that the blame lies with the drivers of the Soviet vehicles in all of the cases specified in your letter.

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For example, on 23 March 1983, USMLM vehicle No. 27 squeezed into a column of Soviet military vehicles and moved right up to the rear of a KAMAZ military vehicle, thus being in a blind spot for the driver of the truck. Then, when the column reduced speed, the USMLM vehicle crashed into the Soviet vehicle. The driver of the KAMAZ did not notice the collision and continued on.

On 16 December 1983, members of the USMLM in vehicle No. 23 approaching a military column head-on photographed military equipment. In an attempt by the USMLM personnel to evade a detention, there was a collision between the USMLM vehicle and a Soviet truck.

And finally, on 13 March 1984, USMLM personnel Major Black, Major Bohn and Technical Sergeant Dewey in Vehicle No. 23 penetrated a permanent restricted area and photographed Soviet military aircraft conducting bombing training. When Soviet military personnel attempted to detain the vehicle of your Mission, it entered an unrestricted area where it was detained near the town of Belgern. In blocking the vehicle there was a collision between the Soviet and American vehicles.

You contend that Soviet military personnel deliberately create dangerous situations and use physical force on the crews of the USMLM. The facts indicate something different. A tendency toward frequent and serious violations by personnel of your Mission of the road safety regulations of the GDR has recently become noticeable. This creates danger to the health and lives of those nearby and to the Mission personnel themselves.

For example, on 2 February 1983, in Wiesenburg, the crew of vehicle No. 29, Major Eschrich and Sergeant Poindexter, travelled at great speed in conditions of poor visibility, not observing traffic regulations, and were involved in a vehicular accident. The USMLM vehicle skidded into a roadside ditch and rolled over.

In March 1983 alone there were seven incidents involving dangerous speeding by drivers of USMLM vehicles.

On 28 January 1984, personnel of your Mission, Captain Croxall and Sergeant Schaffner in vehicle No. 28, attempted at great speed to pass a cargo vehicle and, after having broken traffic laws, crashed into a tree.

Very often drivers of Mission vehicles do not fulfill the demands of the representative of the Peoples' Police of the GDR. It is not difficult to see from these types of violations and auto accidents that it is impossible to find any signs of the use of physical force. Moreover, there is no basis to maintain that there is an alleged increase in hostility toward members of your Mission.

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In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the command element of Group of Soviet Forces Germany attaches great significance to the activity of the Military Liaison Missions and, in accordance with the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, takes and will continue to take all necessary measures to ensure normal activity of the personnel of your Mission.

Respectfully,

I. SVIRIDOV  
GEN-COL  
Chief of Staff, GSFG"

No response was made to this letter. The two accidents to which Sviridov referred were minor in nature, completely unavoidable, and involved neither Soviet nor East German personnel. The seven incidents in March 1983 were never mentioned before nor since and were probably pure inventions added to pad the indictment of USMLM personnel

5. On 28 Apr, SERB passed a response to the US letter of 17 Apr which had protested a Soviet violation of FRG air space. Text of the reply follows:

"Dear General:

The protest made in your letter of 17 April 1984 concerning the alleged violation of the airspace of the FRG by Soviet military helicopters between 6 and 10 March 1984 cannot be accepted.

As a result of an investigation and an analysis of the information from an objective investigation of helicopter flights in the border zone, it has been established that violations of the state border of the FRG by helicopters of the Air Forces cannot be corroborated. Helicopter crews flying in the border zone did not approach closer than 2 kilometers to the border. The flights were made only under visual flight conditions which completely rule out any violation of the border. The side numbers of individual helicopters specified by you can be observed from the FRG with special optical or television equipment.

Respectfully,

I. SVIRIDOV  
GEN-COL  
Chief of Staff, GSFG"

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6. On 3 May, Chief USMLM sent a letter to SERB advising that the 2500 liters of gasoline provided on a monthly basis to USMLM was 500 liters less than that furnished the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt and asking that USMLM's allocation be raised to 3000 liters. The letter further advised that, should this increase not be possible, parity would be achieved through a reduction in SMLM-F's allowance. (Letter was never answered but USMLM almost immediately started receiving the additional 500 liters per month).

7. On 16 May, Chief USMLM delivered the following letter of protest to COL Malygin, Acting Chief SERB:

"Dear Colonel Malygin,

The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention yet another crude, illegal and dangerous interference by East German authorities in the authorized activities of USMLM. On 15 May at approximately 1115 hours, LTC Boyette and TSgt Dewey, travelling in USMLM Car Nr 21, were transiting Karl-Marx-Stadt, a city which as you well know is clearly located in a nonrestricted area. While observing the rules of the road in no proximity to any military activity, they were suddenly and without warning forced off the road and up against a metal railing by a white Wartburg of East German registry. This same car then backed into the USMLM vehicle while simultaneously a red Wartburg struck the vehicle from the rear. A third car, a white Lada, then pulled up along the driver's side of car Nr. 21 completely boxing in the USMLM vehicle. The occupants of these three vehicles, obviously agents of the Ministry for State Security, then jumped out of their cars and attempted to force their way into the USMLM vehicle. Failing this, they banged on the windows and made threatening gestures to LTC Boyette and TSgt Dewey. They next proceeded to take innumerable photographs of the vehicle and its occupants. After a while, the MfS vehicles were replaced by VOPC cars and additional uniformed policemen. Throughout the detention, East German authorities were obnoxious and arrogant and even went so far as to erect a Mission Restriction Sign in close proximity to the USMLM vehicle.

Although the first Soviet vehicle (03-97 RN, Military Kommandatura markings) appeared on the scene at 1150 hours, it was not until 1302 hours that a Soviet officer finally approached the vehicle and identified himself as LTC A.W. Bazgiev, a representative of the local Kommandatura. This officer eventually escorted the USMLM vehicle away from the scene which had by now attracted approximately 200 spectators.

This provocative carnival organized by East German authorities, we will both agree, is an insult to our relationship. I strongly

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protest such a crude violation of our status as guaranteed by the Huebner-Malinin agreement. I also strongly protest the unwillingness of HQ GSFG to fulfill its clearly stated obligation to provide for the security of USMLM. And finally I strongly protest the inability of HQ GSFG to exercise any restraint on East German authorities in matters where they have absolutely no jurisdiction.

I am sure I need not again remind you of the continued protection enjoyed by General Major Pyal'tsev and his fellow officers and NCCs in Frankfurt.

I ask you to immediately convey my concerns to General Zaytsev and provide me assurances that such serious departures from the established norms of our relationship will not be repeated.

Sincerely,

ROLAND LAJOIE  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Mission"

Malygin had no comment to offer other than that the correspondence would be expeditiously forwarded to HQ GSFG.

Other matters discussed at this time included the Chief of Mission's disappointment at the cavalier way in which the new PRA map had been delivered and the lack of warning (the map was actually delivered some 12 hours after its effective date). Malygin apologized and stated that the map had been distributed immediately upon receipt by SERB. Chief USMLM expressed his disappointment at the recent refusal to grant the USCGB and his wife a guest pass to visit Wittenberg in the company of the Chief. Malygin's response was predictably that he (and by inference SERB and GSFG) was not competent to pass upon such matters, touching as they do upon the territorial integrity of the GDR.

8. On 12 Jun, USMLM received a letter from SERB dated 11 Jun 84 in which Colonel Malygin, "...directed by the Chief of Staff, GSFG", raised the issue of pass exchanges. The letter changed pass exchange policy, requiring resubmission of personal information and ID photos for each reaccreditation requested and seven days notice and indicated that GSFG regarded the number of pass exchanges requested as inordinately large.

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At the Bastille Day reception in Potsdam a few days later Chief USMLM discussed the matter with Colonels Malygin and Medved and with General Serov. They noted that their own Mission in Frankfurt was limited to 14 accredited members as specified by "international agreements and standard diplomatic practice." Chief USMLM replied to the effect that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and no other document or convention defined this exclusively bilateral relationship. It was also pointed out that the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt has the same option as does USMLM and should in fact consider a more frequent rotation of personnel.

(USMLM decided to take the spotlight off this issue which give USMLM considerable operational flexibility and actually to reduce requests for pass exchanges by approximately one third.)

9. On 15 Jun, the following Chief of Staff USAREUR letter of protest regarding the new Soviet PRA map was delivered to SERB by Chief USMLM:

"Dear General Sviridov:

I have studied the revised Permanently Restricted Areas your headquarters imposed on the Allied Military Liaison Missions effective 15 May 1984.

I note with extreme displeasure that the new restrictions violate the spirit of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement which guarantees "complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones except in places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision."

Your new Permanently Restricted Areas specifically include a substantial portion of the national highway net of East Germany as well as key road junctions and bridges which are absolutely necessary to unimpeded transit. This will effectively deny to the U.S. Mission large parts of the country that are not formally included in restricted areas. The provision allowing USMLM autobahn transit of restricted areas does not begin to compare with the rights of access and transit afforded your mission in West Germany, with its much greater density of Autobahns and improved highways.

Indicative of the arbitrarily restrictive nature of your new map is the fact that Torgau, the very place our armies joined in 1945 and where our officers met again last November to bury an American veteran, is now located in a Permanently Restricted Area. In the spirit of Torgau I believe you should consider the situation your restrictions will inevitably create for both the Soviet and American

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Military Missions. The ability of our liaison officers to move freely about our respective zones is a basic principle guaranteed under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. In this way, the missions under us are able to demonstrate, by their presence, our mutual commitment to the spirit of our wartime cooperation.

Respectfully,

C. J. Fiala  
Major General, General Staff  
Chief of Staff"

There was no immediate comment by Malygin, and this letter was never answered by GSFG.

10. On 30 Jul, Chief USMLM delivered a letter protesting the detention of MAJ Wise and SSG Johnston at the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp Memorial. Excerpts from the letter appear below:

"Dear Colonel Pereverzev,

I must report yet another unwarranted and illegal interference by the East German police in USMLM activities. This most recent incident demonstrates East German willingness to violate our status as guaranteed by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement (details of detention). This crude detention in the public parking lot of an internationally recognized war memorial located in an open area is one of the most insulting encounters we have had with the East German authorities...

I remind you of your legal obligations to provide for the security and well being of American liaison personnel...I trust you will fully investigate this matter and provide me with an explanation."

11. On 21 Aug, Gen Krivosheyev, newly appointed, Chief of Staff GSFG, visited the USMLM Potsdam residence. The visit, part of an inspection of all three Allied Mission houses, lasted exactly 30 minutes. His announced objectives included to meet the Chief and Deputy and to see for himself how the Mission lived and what he could do to improve its standard of living. After the cursory inspection he addressed three problems:

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a. USMLM-proposed high level US-GSFG meetings are complicated by deployment of Pershings and off-the-cuff remarks by American leaders. He responded with little enthusiasm to Chief USMLM's position that an overall chill in the US-Soviet relationship need not rule out military contacts. He was also pessimistic about his meeting the USAREUR Chief of Staff at the USMLM Thanksgiving Dinner.

b. GSFG desires a definitive USAREUR answer concerning a former GSFG soldier Sergei Zhura who had defected to the FRG. Chief USMLM replied that Gen Fiala had already provided a definitive answer to Gen Pyal'tsev, Chief SMLM-F, namely that the defector was not in US custody. Krivosheyev expressed some skepticism on this point.

c. GSFG's annoyance with the USMLM practice of frequent pass exchanges. Chief USMLM responded first with the argument that this was a long-standing, purely administrative measure of no particular consequence. SMLM-F's policy of 14 personnel, 14 passes is self-inflicted and could easily be changed, a reflection of geographic reality.

12. On 25 Aug, Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at the latter's request to discuss a variety of subjects:

a. Soviet Defector: Colonel Pereverzev quoted Colonel General Krivosheyev, GSFG Chief of Staff, who desired a more definitive answer than had been received to date concerning the Soviet defector Sergey Ivanovich Zhura. Chief USMLM responded to the effect that Zhura was not in US hands, precisely the information passed by the USAREUR Chief of Staff to the Chief, SMLM-F, and by Chief USMLM to General Krivosheyev on 21 Aug 84 during the latter's tour of inspection of the Potsdam House.

b. USMLM Traffic Violations: In response to a series of allegations concerning alleged USMLM violations of traffic regulations and speeding in the GDR, Chief USMLM requested a detailed list of offenses. Although Chief SERB had alluded earlier to 60 violations in the first six months of 1984, he produced a list of only three, relatively minor, violations.

c. 24 Aug Detention: Pereverzev indicated his concern that the detained USMLM tour vehicle had only one license plate. CUSMLM indicated that he shared this concern, since the missing license plate had been stolen by East German personnel, an action typical of the behavior of the East Germans with regard to the Missions. Although avowedly skeptical, Pereverzev said he would look into the matter.

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d. Chief SERB used the detention issue to complain about the Mission's repeated failures to honor Mission Restriction Signs (MRS). Chief USMLM's reply included the following points: USMLM respects and does not violate PRA, which are well known, have clearly defined boundaries, and encompass approximately 39% of the GDR; paying heed to unannounced, unmapped, constantly changing MRS would probably result in the denial of an additional 40% of the country to the Missions. Subject of the new USAREUR PRA map was raised.

e. Pereverzev stated that the position of SMLM-F in Frankfurt was extremely restricted. Chief USMLM responded that GSFG had opened the new round of PRA imposition, that USAREUR had responded to establish parity, and that the US was prepared to negotiate to lower levels.

13. On 18 Sep, at a meeting at the SERB offices in Potsdam, Colonel Pereverzev handed CUSMLM a letter requesting a meeting with the defector S. I. Zhura who, according to the letter, was "in the hands of American military authorities in Europe." The letter reminded the U.S. side of GSFG's assistance in arranging for prompt return of Allied servicemen and dependents who had gone astray in the GDR and mentioned the desire of Zhura's family members that such a meeting be arranged.

Chief USMLM used the meeting to bring up two additional points for discussion:

a. Renovation of the two houses in the Potsdam compound. Colonel Pereverzev seemed to be genuinely interested in getting the work done.

b. The improper questioning of USMLM NCOs during visits to the Potsdam House by two SERB officers (MAL'TSEV and GRIGORYAN). Chief USMLM requested that Chief SERB caution his officers about such activities. Pereverzev seemed somewhat embarrassed but rather than being defensive as expected he attributed it to "the improper curiosity of junior officers."

14. On 17 Oct, Chief USMLM and Chief SERB met at the former's request. The first order of business was to deliver USAREUR's response to GSFG's protest regarding the improper guest pass documentation of TSGT Manning (See Detentions and Incidents, para H, page 47, for details). Colonel Pereverzev objected to USAREUR's use of the term "PNG" since TSGT Manning was not on pass, hence not accredited, at the time of the detention and hence could not be discredited. This led to another discussion of the pass exchange issue, with Pereverzev refusing to admit that pass exchanges had

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decreased significantly, particularly when compared with requests submitted by SMLM-F. It was suggested that SMLM-F increase the number of their pass requests if parity was the real issue.

Chief USMLM then advised SERB of the following with respect to I. R. Zhura, the defector from GSFG:

- a. Zhura is in the United States.
- b. All further inquiries regarding his status should be made through diplomatic channels.
- c. Zhura, should he choose to do so, is eligible to apply for US citizenship.

Chief SERB, visibly agitated at this response, stated that similar matters had always been handled in a more positive fashion and that USAREUR's lack of helpfulness in this matter would not go unnoticed at Wuensdorf.

Next, a Chief USMLM letter of protest regarding the 9 Oct obstreperous surveillance, pursuit, and threatening of a USMLM tour by MfS personnel was passed to Chief SERB. Pereverzev indicated that he had only USMLM's word as to the nature of the incident and that the US version was probably exaggerated. Chief USMLM replied that this most recent incident was noteworthy even considering the usual omnipresent surveillance in the GDR and represented a blatant and dangerous practice which was clearly unacceptable. This evoked an unconvincing response that the letter would be brought to the attention of responsible "colleagues." In this connection, Chief USMLM mentioned the recent cases of theft of USMLM license plates. Pereverzev seemed genuinely astonished that anyone would regard the plates as in any way desirable. He suggested once more that prompt notification of the responsible Kommendatura and cooperation in the latter's investigation were appropriate ways to handle such problems.

Other items discussed included the recent announcement of the imminent closure of the Glienicke Bridge, lack of progress on renovations of the Potsdam residence, and Gen Fiala's intention to attend the Thanksgiving Dinner at Potsdam. Pereverzev was reminded of USAREUR invitation for Gen Krivosheyev to also attend this function. Chief SERB was decidedly unenthusiastic and cautious about the likelihood of Krivosheyev's attendance.

15. On 03 Nov, CUSMLM delivered the CINCUSAREUR letter protesting the imminent closure of the Glienicke Bridge to CSERB in Potsdam. Colonel Pereverzev appeared to be genuinely puzzled by the importance attached by the Allies to the bridge issue. He indicated that, should the bridge in fact be closed, he was prepared to

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guarantee unlimited and separate Allied access to the Drewitz crossing point, with a special unit present solely to process Allied Mission traffic. Pereverzev was reminded of the importance attached by the US to keeping this historic and functional link between West Berlin and East Germany open and functioning.

Chief SERB also inquired about US general officer attendees at the 17 Nov Thanksgiving Day dinner. Upon receipt of the names, Pereverzev solicited possible topics of conversation should the GSFG Chief of Staff in fact decide to attend "...aside, of course, from PRA, your favorite topic of discussion."

Concerning the PRA issue, Pereverzev again complained about the claustrophobic conditions under which SMLM-F was forced to operate in Frankfurt. He contrasted this with the USMLM situation in Potsdam, and suggested that, unless some adjustment was made, GSFG might be forced to close Potsdam. Chief USMLM responded that parity had finally been achieved and that any further GSFG restrictions would inevitably and necessarily provoke further restrictions by USAREUR.

Pereverzev next complained about de facto PRA in the FRG, i.e., areas which were ostensibly not restricted, but which could in fact not be reached without violation of one or more PRA. Chief USMLM used this opportunity to show Pereverzev how the area between the Cottbus and Brand PRA, as depicted on the GSFG PRA map, fell precisely into this category. The two Chiefs then bemoaned the presence of bright security personnel on both staffs who could play such dirty tricks on innocent liaison personnel.

After a brief exchange covering a possible reduction in/elimination of Mission Restriction Signs (CUSMLM showed no enthusiasm, mentioning that the Allies did not recognize the validity of these signs), CSERB again asked about the possibility of returning to the old PRA boundaries. CUSMLM indicated his belief that this could be done only as an interim measure pending the establishment of new maps with lower equal levels.

16. On 10 Nov, Chief USMLM received the GSFG reply to the CINCUSAREUR letter of protest concerning the proposed closing of the Glienicke Bridge. It was to the effect that the bridge closure was a purely technical matter without political overtones and that a favorable resolution could be easily achieved if the Berlin Senat agreed to underwrite all repairs and to accept that no conditions could be attached to this agreement. The reply was presented in the form of a note verbale. In response to CUSMLM's query as to whether this informal document in fact represented the official GSFG reply to CINCUSAREUR's signed letter, Chief SERB stated that this was the

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only reply he was authorized to give, although there existed a possibility that a formal GSFG reply would be forthcoming. He also admitted that both the British and French Chiefs of Mission had been somewhat astonished at the informal nature of the response.

17. On 12 Dec, CUSMLM met with CSERB at the SERB Potsdam offices. The agenda included:

a. USMLM delivery of a USAREUR protest concerning violation of FRG air space. Pereverzev appeared annoyed and commented that the protest could surely have been handled the previous day by his deputy. CUSMLM used the opportunity afforded to state that USAREUR viewed the overflights as very important and that he was instructed, whenever possible, to make a personal delivery of protest letters to Chief SERB.

b. Anticipated delivery of a new GSFG PRA map. Pereverzev opined that a new map would be ready sometime after the first of the year.

c. Discussions of USMLM attendance at the Feb 85 Soviet Army-Navy Day Reception sponsored by the GSFG Chief of Staff. Pereverzev asked whether a larger USMLM attendance could be expected than in recent years. He pointed out that, despite political differences, nothing in particular was gained when an agency whose avowed purpose was liaison insulted the Chief of Staff of the headquarters to which it was accredited. Chief USMLM reminded Pereverzev that the attendance issue could be traced back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (USMLM was finally allowed to attend in 1985 with six officers and wives.)

d. Discussions concerning possible special observances of the 40th anniversary of the US-Soviet link-up at Torgau. Chief USMLM mentioned that the exploitation of Soviet and US veterans' groups on the occasion of Joe Polowsky's burial at Torgau in 1983 had been poorly received by the US side. It was pointed out that the US would certainly not be interested in participation in any event where the ground rules were not clearly spelled out and in which guarantees could not be furnished that no effort would be made to obtain a propaganda advantage from such an event. Pereverzev said that the Soviet side "would never abandon our propaganda efforts for peace."



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C. (U) SOCIAL EVENTS (All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated):

1. General.

USMLM's program of representational and liaison social activities serves the following objectives:

a. Enhances the spirit of Tri-Mission operational cooperation through the development of binding social associations among members of the US, British, and French Military Liaison Missions, to include counterpart personnel of all ranks.

b. Establishes an atmosphere of professional respect and social amenity between USMLM liaison personnel and their Soviet counterparts in order to facilitate conditions that serve USMLM's operational and liaison interests.

c. (C) Provides an opportunity for senior US and Soviet military officers to meet with Soviet officers in a social atmosphere, permitting them to gain a deeper perception of the personal and professional traits of the Soviet military establishment.


d. (C) Exercises official rights of access to the official USMLM residence in Potsdam in accordance with established patterns that demonstrate US intentions to make advantageous use of opportunities afforded by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

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## 2. US-Sponsored Social Events

a. USMLM/Torgau Anniversary Commemoration: The annual Torgau Reception, commemorating the first meeting of US and Soviet troops at the Elbe River in April 1945, was hosted by USMLM at the Potsdam House on 19 April 1984 from 1800 to 2100 hours. Senior US representative was Brigadier General Eckelberger, Commander, VII Corps Artillery. Major General Serov, Headquarters, GSFG, was the senior Soviet officer in attendance. Other senior guests included Brigadier Learmont, Chief BRIXMIS, and Colonel Huet, Chief FMLM. Soviet guests included Colonel Malygin, Acting Chief SERB, members of his staff, the Potsdam Kommandant, and the Commander of the Soviet Berlin Brigade. Sixty US, Allied, and Soviet officers attended. Major General Serov in a toast alluded to the Allied cooperation in WW II, emphasized the need for continuing military cooperation and rapport and praised the role of the Military Liason Missions in helping to preserve the wartime ties.



b. Independence Day Celebration: On 30 June USMLM hosted the annual Independence Day picnic at Potsdam House. The senior US representative was MG Fiala, Chief of Staff, USAREUR. The Chiefs of BRIXMIS and FMLM, accompanied by members of their organizations, attended.. No Soviet general officer attended. The Soviet delegation was led by the Chief of SERB. Inclement weather forced a cancellation of most activities and greatly reduced attendance.

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e. Thanksgiving Dinner: On 17 November USMLM hosted its annual Thanksgiving Day Celebration at Potsdam. The senior US representative was Major General Fiala, Chief of Staff USAREUR. In a departure from precedent, General-Colonel Krivosheyev, Chief of Staff, GSFG, led the Soviet delegation. The two Chiefs of Staff discussed the following matters in the course of a private conversation: the threatened Glienicke Bridge closing, prospects for of a CINC-CINC meeting, the upcoming fortieth anniversary of V-E Day, and the newly established Permanent Restricted Areas.

f. Christmas Party for the Potsdam House East German Employees: On 21 December USMLM expressed its appreciation to the staff at Potsdam House for its contribution throughout the year at a buffet dinner during which gifts were distributed to staff members and their families.

g. US-Soviet Gift Exchange: On 28 December 1984, USMLM hosted its annual holiday party for SERB officers and their families. The SERB delegation, including CSERB COL Pereversev, COL Medved', six other SERB officers, and their wives, accepted gifts from Generals Otis, Fiala, and Gordon. One topic, USMLM attendance at the Soviet Army-Navy Day reception, received a great deal of emphasis from the guests. Pereversev contrasted SERB's attendance at this USMLM function with USMLM's attendance at the GSFG CofS-hosted Army-Navy Day reception. He indicated that it was incongruous that a unit charged with liaison should snub the Chief of Staff of the element to which they were accredited. Throughout the evening, the normally reticent wives reinforced Pereversev's plea for increased attendance, to include wives.

3. Soviet-Sponsored Social Events:

a. Soviet Army/Navy Day Celebration: On 24 February 1984, the Chief of Staff, GSFG, hosted a reception in Potsdam to commemorate Soviet Army/Navy Day. FMLM and BRIXMIS attendance was up from the previous year while USMLM was still represented by Chief USMLM and Deputy without wives.

b. Soviet/Allied Military Mission Gift Exchange: The three Allied Chiefs of Mission, accompanied by four accredited Liaison Officers, attended the Soviet Seasonal Gift Exchange at SERB, Potsdam, on 28 December. A traditional Russian buffet contributed to making this a most congenial event.

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PART IV LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (NOTE: All paragraphs and subparagraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated)

A. GENERAL

1. During 1984 no significant construction on the West Berlin compound was accomplished. Some landscaping, primarily removal of trees and bushes, was conducted.

2. The responsibility to provide logistic support to the USMLM facility rests with the Soviets who provided:

a. Coal for heating the main building's during the heating season. Natural gas is provided for the stoves and electricity for lighting and appliances.

b. Gas coupons for US liaison personnel travelling in East Germany. Coupons for VK 94 are issued every two months in the amount of 2500 liters per month.

c. Rations delivered twice weekly consisted of fresh and frozen meat, vegetables and fruits. These basic food items are supplemented by US funded commissary purchases, particularly condiments and frozen vegetables.

d. Trash is picked up by the Soviets bi-weekly.

e. Both East and West German telephone service is installed and is supplemented by an HF radio connection to USMLM Berlin.

f. The entrance to the Potsdam compound is guarded by an East German policeman around the clock. A staff of ten East Germans are paid by the Soviets to provide cooking, housekeeping, yard and building maintenance.

3. The renovation of the exterior of the main house was completed in June 1984 after recurring delays. With the masonry still wet, the scaffolding was torn down on 28 June in preparation for the Independence Day celebration. The poor quality of craftsmanship and inferior materials were quickly evident as sections of the molding fell off, cracks appeared in the walls and leaks from the balconies blemished the interior walls and ceilings.

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4. An extensive reconstruction program was formulated in July and undertaken by a joint Soviet - US Army Berlin DEH effort. The purpose of the project is to completely rehabilitate or replace the heating, plumbing and electrical systems of both the large and small houses. In addition, the roofs are to be repaired and the recurring problems resolved with long-term solutions in lieu of the inadequate quick-fix approach which the Soviets have provided in the past. A comprehensive plan was initiated with the small villa serving as the focus of the first phase. The roof repairs were started in November, two months after the scheduled start date. In spite of this inauspicious beginning, the Soviets' projected completion date in April 1985 was eventually met. Following the Torgau celebration on 25 April 1985, the main house will be vacated and all support facilities transferred to the small villa until renovation of the main house is complete. To insure preservation of the style of the house, an interior decoration plan is being developed by the Berlin Directorate of Engineering and Housing.

B. (C) VEHICLES

1. Vehicle Status

a. As of 31 DEC 83:

1) Fleet Composition

Two 1978 Opel Senators  
One 1979 Mercedes 350 SE Sedans  
Two 1980 Mercedes 350 SE Sedans  
One 1983 Mercedes 280 SE Sedan  
Three 1984 Mercedes 280 SE Sedans  
Two 1980 Mercedes 280 GE 4-wheel drive 2 door Vehicles  
Seven 1981 Mercedes 280 GE 4-wheel drive 2 door Vehicles  
Three 1983 Mercedes 280 4-wheel drive 2 door Vehicles  
Three 1984 Mercedes 280 4-wheel drive 2 door Vehicles  
One 1979 Ford Transit Van  
One 1983 Ford Panel Truck  
One 1983 Volkswagen Kombi 9 Passenger Van  
One 1984 Volkswagen Kombi 9 Passenger Van

Total number of vehicles: 28

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b. Two 280 GE four-door and two 280 GE two-door station wagons were ordered for delivery in May 1985.

2. Accreditations: USMLM currently is assigned ten vehicle accreditations, of which five are allocated to sedans and five to 280 GE vehicles.

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C. (C) PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY PRODUCTION STATISTICS (NOTE: All elements of this section classified CONFIDENTIAL):

<u>ROLLS OF FILM PROCESSED (35mm)</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1983</u>
Black and White (Original)	1690	2091
Color (Original and Dupe)	992	1345
Duplicate Black and White	233	233
<u>PRINT PRODUCTION</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1983</u>
Proofs	33,061	51,740
Intelligence Report Prints	137,517	110,729
Total Prints	170,578	162,469

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ANNEX A HUEBNER - MALININ AGREEMENT

A G R E E M E N T

MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES  
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadri-partite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."

5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

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7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of the Commander-In-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of the Soviet or United States Mission wants to visit the United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24 - 72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and the headquarters of their respective Commander-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communications through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they will also be given facilities such as mail, telephone, and telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of breakdown in the radio installation the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communications.

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12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies, and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition, the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full rights of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the missions will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in the Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by the Deputy Commanders of the United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

/s/ C. R. Huebner  
/t/ Lieutenant General HUEBNER

Deputy Commander-in-Chief  
European Command

/s/ Malinin  
/t/ Colonel-General MALININ

Deputy Commander-in-Chief  
Chief of Staff of the Group  
of Soviet Occupational  
Forces in Germany

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ANNEX B TOURING STATISTICS

A. (C) TOURS AND TOUR DAYS, 1984:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOURS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOUR DAYS</u>
January	46	89
February	44	92
March	55	114
April	44	99
May	41	84
June	41	99
July	42	92
August	40	87
September	36	79
October	50	110
November	39	84
December	41	87
TOTALS	519	1044

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B. TOTAL DISTANCE, 1984: 579,914 km

C. COMPARISON, 1983 AND 1984:

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>PERCENT CHANGE</u>
TOURS	513	519	+01.2
TOUR DAYS	1060	1044	-01.6
DISTANCE	649,197 KM	579,914 KM	-10.7

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1984

PRESENT FOR DUTY, 31 DECEMBER 1984

COL	LAJOIE, ROLAND	USA
LTCOL	BOYETTE, PAUL A.	USAF
LTCOL	KELLEY, LAWRENCE G.	USMC
LTC	PETERS, MICHAEL P.	USA
MAJ	BLACK, ARTHUR N.	USAF
MAJ	BGHN, CHARLES J. III	USAF
MAJ	BORT, ROGER E.	USA
MAJ	ESCHRICH, JOHN E.	USA
MAJ	LYONS, RICHARD D.	USA
MAJ	MILTON, THEODORE R. JR.	USA
MAJ	NELSON, PAUL H.	USA
MAJ	NICHOLSON, ARTHUR D. JR.	USA
MAJ	SILVA, JAMES M.	USA
MAJ	WISE, ROBERT W.	USA
MAJ	WYCKOFF, THOMAS G.	USA
CAPT	CROXALL, GARY L.	USA
CAPT	GALLAGHER, EDWARD A.	USAF
MSG	YELL, CHARLES E. JR.	USA
SMSGT	STAIDA, LARRY K.	USAF
SFC	MINTZ, ROBERT J.	USA
MSGT	MOSES, THELTON L.	USAF

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1984 (CONTINUED)

SFC	SATORO, GREGORY C.	USA
SFC	TIFFANY, HANS-JOACHIM H.	USA
TSGT	BENICKEN, JOHN A.	USAF
SSG	BENTON, JAMES F.	USA
SSG	BLAKE, RONALD H.	USA
TSGT	CHANDLEE, MICHAEL J.	USAF
SSG	DAVIS, EBYLEE	USA
SSG	JOHNSTON, JON E. W.	USA
TSGT	MANNING, LANCE E.	USAF
SSG	MCDOWALL, JAMES H.	USA
SSG	MCMULLEN, W. L.	USA
SSG	SCHATZ, JESSIE G.	USA
SSG	SCHWAB, LAWRENCE R.	USA
SSG	TABARANI, LISA J.	USA
SP5	CLEMMONS, STEPHEN T.	USA
SSGT	CUSHMAN, MARK T.	USAF
SGT(P)	EAIRHEART, STEVE J.	USA
SSGT	FRIDGE, CARL E.	USAF
SP5	JOHNSON, CHARLES D.	USA
SP5	JOHNSON, EDWARD E. JR.	USA
SGT	KENNEDY, DAVID J.	USA
SGT	KNIGHT, WILLIAM J.	USA

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1984 (CONTINUED)

SSGT	SCHAFFNER JAMES W.	USAF
SGT(P)	SMITH, CHARLES E. II	USA
SP5(P)	THOMPSON, ROBERT A.	USA
SP5	TYSON, DAVID K.	USA
SP5	WHEELER, KEITH G.	USA
SP4(P)	CASSIDY, PATRICK S.	USA
SP4(P)	DIAL, LARRY D.	USA
SGT	FLOURNOY, KATHERIN D.	USAF
SGT	KURTZ, DARRELL L.	USAF
SP4	LEINENMEYER, CHRIS	USA
SP4	PECHULIS, MICHAEL I.	USA
SP4(P)	WIERNAN, LEONARD P. JR	USA
PFC	OSTRANDER, SETH E. IV	USA
MRS	BANKS, BENNIE B.	CIV
MR	BATES, JAMES	CIV
MR	CORBETT, WILLIAM R.	CIV
MR	FEHR, STUART L.	CIV
MS	FUCHS, LINDA C.	CIV
MR	HANDY, MARK A.	CIV
MR	HOYT, STEPHEN V.	CIV
MS	QUINONES, CECILIA M.	CIV
MS	SEMMETT, EDA SUZANNE	CIV
MRS	SEYMOUR, DIANE L.	CIV

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1984 (CONTINUED)

DEPARTURES 1984

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTURE DATE</u>
LTC	GOVAN, GREGORY G.	7 Jun 84
LTCOL	WURZBURGER, NILS L.	2 Aug 84
MAJ	BOLES, JOHN K. III	20 May 84
MAJ	CONNOLLY, MICHAEL P.	29 Jun 84
MAJ	EVANS, CLYDE L.	14 May 84
SMSGT	FISHER, DAVID M.	22 May 84
MSGT	PATTERSON, RONALD P.	13 Jul 84
TSGT	DEWEY, BRUCE L.	23 Jun 84
SSG	JACOBS, HENRY T. JR	30 Apr 84
SSG	NEUHAUSER, ALFRED	14 Sep 84
SSG	UBERLE, LINDA M.	11 Aug 84
SSG	POINDEXTER, MICHAEL D.	7 Oct 84
SP5	DAVIS, STEVEN A.	14 Jul 84
SGT	DUPERROIR, RONALD A.	2 Aug 84
SSGT	KAYE, RICHARD R.	12 Nov 84
SP5	RHOADES, TIMOTHY E.	23 Aug 84
SP5	SANDGMIR, ALAN N.	19 Jan 84
SP4	NIXON, TRACY J.	31 Oct 84
MR	CREEKMORE, MICHAEL	15 Aug 84
MS	CHAFFIN, LIZBETH	31 Oct 84

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#### ANNEX D DEALINGS WITH SERB, STATISTICS

(C) A Unit History is often of use to the originating unit as an internal record of background information and precedent affecting current operations. This Annex has as its purpose the provision of just such an internal record of USMLM-SERB transactions for the period 1980-1984. Included are: total annual guest pass requests and total annual requests for accreditation changes for personnel and for vehicles.

##### A. GUEST PASS REQUESTS:

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
JANUARY	3	23	48	24	22
FEBRUARY	41	42	39	30	20
MARCH	53	58	82	34	37
APRIL	118	85	104	93	36
MAY	33	42	43	17	39
JUNE	500	106	314	345	58
JULY	56	362	50	36	26
AUGUST	68	72	40	62	35
SEPTEMBER	60	22	25	38	29
OCTOBER	29	39	37	51	24
NOVEMBER	126	72	93	140	34
DECEMBER	69	16	61	119	28
TOTAL	1056	900	926	949	388

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B. PASS EXCHANGES

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
JANUARY	14	14	12	15	23
FEBRUARY	20	15	19	13	26
MARCH	16	11	13	19	18
APRIL	16	11	10	12	18
MAY	20	14	10	17	22
JUNE	8	16	12	21	16
JULY	16	20	13	16	12
AUGUST	17	17	20	25	12
SEPTEMBER	8	13	13	21	10
OCTOBER	11	10	14	20	10
NOVEMBER	12	15	17	21	11
DECEMBER	12	13	18	25	13
TOTAL	165	179	171	225	191

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C. VEHICLE EXCHANGES

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
JANUARY		1			
FEBRUARY		2	2		
MARCH					
APRIL					
MAY					
JUNE	1			1	
JULY	2		1		
AUGUST					
SEPTEMBER	1				
OCTOBER	1	2			
NOVEMBER		2	1		
DECEMBER	1	1			
TOTAL	6	6	4	1	0

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ANNEX E. (C) USMLM MEMBERS DECORATED BY CINCUSAREUR.

On 23 February 1984, General Glenn K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, presented awards for special collection achievement to the USMLM members listed below:

MAJ Clyde Evans	Defense Meritorious Service Medal
MAJ Arthur D. Nicholson Jr.	Defense Meritorious Service Medal
SSG Michael D. Poindexter	Defense Commendation Medal
SGT Steve Fairheart	Defense Commendation Medal




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#### ANNEX F. The Glienicke Bridge

For more than 25 years the Glienicke Bridge has been the entry and exit point to and from the GDR for Allied Mission traffic. In November 1984, the Chiefs of Mission were notified that the bridge was to be permanently closed by the East German government on the grounds that it was unsafe for travel. After protracted and complex negotiations involving the Commanders in Chief of USAREUR and GSFG, the State Department and the Soviet Foreign Office, the West Berlin Senat and the GDR Department of External Relations, and the three Allied Chiefs of Mission and Chief SERB, the decision was reached that the bridge would remain open, with, however, the proviso that the West Berlin government would pay for all repairs and upkeep and would receive in return no concessions of any sort from the East German government.



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1-CMDT USA WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE PA 17013  
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1-AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL AFB AL 36112  
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1-DATT, AMEMB MOSCOW  
1-DATT, AMEMB WARSAW  
2-ODCSI USCOB  
1-TAREX BLN  
2-BRIXMIS  
2-FMLM

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